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Introduction
North Korea is a nation-state that for many years (including the years
following the Cold War) has been off of the main radar for American for-
eign policy.  Whether it was because the United States was worried about
other issues such as problems in the Balkans in the 1990s, or fighting wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan in the new millennium, challenges from the DPRK
never seemed to be at the top of the priorities list with American foreign
policy makers.  This has now changed.  It has become obvious to the world
that North Korea has an active nuclear weapons program, and that Pyongy-
ang has not been shy about threatening to use it.  It is also obvious that
North Korea has long and short range ballistic missiles that can not only
threaten the region but potentially the United States, and through prolifera-
tion, areas as far away as the Middle East.  Since North Korea is now not
only acknowledged as a threat to the international order but, in a very
potentially violent way, to the American homeland, one wonders, how does
this highly threatening and possibly the most sanctioned regime-continue
to survive?  The answer is largely through North Korea’s illicit activities—
activities that support and enable the Kim family regime.
† Professor of Political Science, Angelo State University.  This Article is an excerpt
from a new book by Dr. Bechtol entitled, North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle
East and Africa: Enabling Violence and Instability (University Press of Kentucky,
2018).  Due to differing editing styles, there may be minor format and wording
differences between this Article and the final version of the book.
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Because North Korea’s rogue state activities have put it on several sanc-
tions lists, one would think that the DPRK would be economically
squeezed.  This is true, but because of an incredibly sophisticated financial
network that operates worldwide (much like a crime family network),
North Korea is able to get its tentacles into numerous banks, supported by
at least dozens of front companies.  But it does not stop there.  I will also
consider, in detail, the highly nuanced measures that North Korea takes to
get around sanctions and other initiatives that the U.S. and the interna-
tional community have taken to contain Pyongyang’s proliferation, other
illicit activities, and illegal banking actions.
Because military proliferation of both conventional weapons and
weapons of mass destructions (WMD) is the main focus of this book, I will
refer to North Korea’s military proliferation from time to time in this chap-
ter, largely because it will become obvious how much this proliferation
contributes to Pyongyang’s economy.  Thus, it will also be necessary to
conduct a brief analysis of the non-military illicit activities that the DPRK
continues to conduct, by highlighting key aspects of it.  While a list of the
activities I have described above is important, it is also important to know
what the United States has done to contain North Korea’s illicit activities.
Of course, it will also be necessary to look at how the international com-
munity has attempted to do the same— and how successful both the United
States and the international community have been in attempting to curb
both the activities and the financial network that support them.  Finally, I
will address China’s role (often highly debated) in containing North
Korea’s illicit activities and in enforcing sanctions.  I believe the conclu-
sions will be quite compelling.
I. North Korea’s Illicit Financial Networks
In September of 2016, the South Korean press reported that two key
entities within the Korea Workers Party (KWP) who handled funds for the
Kim family regime (and reportedly Kim Jong-un’s private slush fund) had
merged into one.  Office Number 38 and Office Number 39 merged and
became Office Number 39.1  In reality, Office Number 39 had always been
the “managing entity” of North Korea’s illicit money.  In fact, Office Num-
ber 39, originally formed by Kim Jong-il during his father’s reign, has for
many years managed everything from military proliferation, to counterfeit
currency, to a variety of other illicit and illegal activities.2  It will be the
purpose of this section to analyze and evaluate not only the activities of
Office Number 39, but to show the reader the sophisticated financial net-
works that run these illicit activities.  These financial networks are inter-
1. See N. Korea Combines 2 Units Managing Leader’s Coffers into One, KOREA TIMES
(Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/09/485_
215017.html [http://perma.cc/2SBL-JZ83].
2. See generally Tom Burgis, North Korea: The Secrets of Office 39, FIN. TIMES (June
24, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/4164dfe6-09d5-11e5-b6bd-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/Y6C8-QAZQ].
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connected and highly nuanced.  But they all end up in one place: the
coffers of the Kim family regime.
Office Number 39 was formed under Kim Jong-il in the 1970s, when
Kim Il-sung was still in power.3  Since that time, Office Number 39’s illicit
fundraising activities have been significant, reportedly raising money in the
billions of dollars annually for the Kim family regime.  The activities are
incredibly diverse and show that North Korea is now the only government
on earth actively promoting and engaging in large-scale criminal activities,
run by operatives sanctioned by the party.  These activities include (but are
not limited to) counterfeit U.S. currency, counterfeit cigarettes, sales of ille-
gal drugs, illegal export of minerals, including gold, and of course, the
most concerning  money maker when it comes to national security con-
cerns, arms sales (I do not include the large, government organized, opera-
tions of North Korean overseas workers in these activities, as the largest
amount of workers have served or are serving in places such as China,
Russia, and the Middle East, and for the most part, their activities have not
been hidden).  I will later discuss in detail  how North Korea’s Office Num-
ber 39 operatives— diplomats, “businessmen,” and others— use a variety of
illegal methods to conduct their criminal and sanctions busting opera-
tions.4  According to Dr. Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University in South
Korea, the use of foreign currency has risen greatly in North Korea, largely
as a result of all the illicit foreign trade Pyongyang has conducted.5  In the
areas of the country along the Chinese border, much of the illicit trade is
conducted using yuan.6
According to North Korean defector and former overseas trade official
Choi Kin-chol, North Korea’s banking and trading activities have greatly
diversified since 2005, when the United States Treasury Department sanc-
tioned Banco Delta Asia in Macao, setting off a snowball effect that left
North Korean finances out in the cold in banks around Asia and else-
where.7  According to the defector, individuals using individual accounts
and front companies work together to mask their North Korean identity
3. See Kim Kwang Jin, The Defector’s tale: Inside North Korea’s Secret Economy,
WORLD AFF. J. (Sept./Oct. 2011), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/defector
%E2%80%99s-tale-inside-north-korea%E2%80%99s-secret-economy [https://perma.cc/
U2VQ-RFZU].
4. See Alastair Gale, Defectors Detail How North Korea’s Office 39, Feeds Leader’s
Slush Fund, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/defectors-detail-
how-north-koreas-office-39-filters-money-to-kims-private-slush-fund-1410823969 (detail-
ing the spider-web like activities of the North Korean illicit financial network, headed by
Office Number 39) [https://perma.cc/7AS2-DJ3Y].
5. See James Pearson, North Korea’s Black Market Becoming the New Normal,
REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-change-
insight/north-koreas-black-market-becoming-the-new-normal-idUSKCN0S
N00320151029 [https://perma.cc/G5UN-95LD].
6. See Andrei Lankov, How Private Finance Took Hold in North Korea, NK NEWS (June
30, 2015), https://www.nknews.org/2015/06/how-private-finance-took-hold-in-north-
korea/ [https://perma.cc/8JQ5-759G].
7. See Donald Greenlees & David Lague, Squeeze on Banco Delta Asia Hit North
Korea Where It Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/
world/asia/18iht-north.4255039.html [https://perma.cc/N3V2-D4UK].
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and make deposits in small banks in China, Italy, Russia, and Africa.8 (My
research shows it is even more diverse than this).  According to interna-
tional economic expert Bradley Babson, “The North Korean system evolved
over decades in a fragmented way.”  He goes on to articulate, “As a result,
North Korea has no financial statistics, no significant banking supervision,
and no capacity for macroeconomic management of an increasingly mixed
economy.”  Babson also goes on to point out that the army’s ownership
“. . . of significant foreign exchange earning enterprises and affiliated
banks was one way that Kim Jong-il maintained the support of the military
during his tenure . . .”9  Thus, the military, as well as Office Number 38,
have been involved in conducting overseas endeavors that make money for
the regime and for them.  Nevertheless, the dominating force in North
Korea’s shadow economy (or the “royal court economy” as a high ranking
defector would later call it) has always been Office Number 39, which has
overseen this secretive aspect of North Korea’s economy and enhanced its
growth, since the 1970s.
Kim Kwang-jin, a high-ranking North Korean defector who was a key
member of North Korea’s illicit activities network operating out of Singa-
pore, gives us some interesting insight into this shadow economy that has
supported Pyongyang’s military and kept the elites living in high style.
Kim states, “The same economy that cannot produce a usable toothbrush is
now armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons.  I say this as someone who
knows, having been involved, however obliquely, in providing the funds
that made the atom splitting possible.”10  Kim goes on to state in part,
This hidden financial system I’m referring to has no written records; most of
the documents that tell the story— receipts, bank transactions, and the rest—
are destroyed annually by Kim’s direct order (less to prevent outside audit
than for fear that North Korean citizens might learn what was done with all
the money secretly generated while they starved).  Yet this same private
financial network, which belongs exclusively to Kim and the elite ruling
class, produces, by my estimates, fully two hundred times the foreign cash
revenue of the Cabinet-run People’s Economy.
Kim further states, “The Royal Court Economy, which supports this
development, emerged from necessity.  Kim’s dilemma in the early 1990s
was straightforward enough: The collapse of the North Korean economic
regime was total, laid waste by his father Kim Il-sung’s decision to move to
a derivative economy dozens of years earlier, exposing North Korea to the
financial bust of the Soviet bloc.”11  We thus see an illicit economy, based
on the sale of largely illegal goods and sanctioned weapons sales, that
began as a result of a failed legitimate economy during the Cold War, and
8. Alastair Gale, Q&A: High Level Defector on North Korean Trade, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
16, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/09/16/qa-high-level-defector-on-
north-korean-trade/ [https://perma.cc/GD4Z-H96E].
9. Bradley O. Babsen, The Demise of Jang Song Thaek and the Future of North Korea’s
Financial System, 38 NORTH (Feb. 24, 2014), http://38north.org/2014/02/bbabson02
2414/ [https://perma.cc/ZU4A-AC6G].
10. Kim, supra note 3.
11. See id.
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continued to grow in the Post-Cold War era as the Kim Family regime
struggled to find ways to survive despite its isolation from the global finan-
cial system.  Of course, all this illegal activity has led North Korea to
become one of the most corrupt countries on earth.12
According to the South Korean press, current North Korean leader Kim
Jong-un holds slush funds of four to five billion dollars hidden in bank
accounts (not in his name) in such diverse countries as Austria, China,
Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Russia, Singapore, and Switzerland.13  North
Koreans typically use smaller banks that are under less scrutiny and often
are not as strict in enforcing regulations.  North Koreans reportedly even
have deals with the Russian mafia to help them launder their funds, being
managed by officials at the Russian embassy.14  A North Korean “diplo-
mat” who was posted in Russia as a trade representative reportedly
defected in Vladivostok in 2016.  This official, who has been reported to
have been working for Office Number 39, is only one of several I will
address in this Article.15
Speaking of the Russian mafia, it is not an exaggeration to say that this
spider web of individuals, front companies, and banks, all working under
Office Number 39, are very much like a “mafia like” organization.  The
difference between this network and the mafia is that members of North
Korea’s governmental infrastructure— including military members, trade
representatives, and diplomats— planned, founded, and now man this
organization.16  As the United Nations Panel of Experts has noted, this vast
network of shady North Korean entities is so complex that it is often quite
challenging to trace either the true ownership of front companies or how
the money is moved around.17  In 2014, a group of North Korean defectors
implored the Swiss government to crack down on and freeze all of the
assets of the North Korean leadership— but to no avail.18  Thus, the money
continues to flow in to these essentially untouchable accounts with no
accountability to the international community.
12. See Oliver Hotham, N. Korea is Among the Most Corrupt Nations on Earth, Says
NGO, NK NEWS (Dec. 3, 2013), https://www.nknews.org/2013/12/north-korea-is-
among-most-corrupt-nations-on-earth-says-ngo/ [https://perma.cc/HY4S-7AM4].
13. Lee Ha Won & Lee Yong Su, Kim Jong-Un’s Secret Billions, CHOSUNILBO (Mar. 12,
2013), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/03/12/2013031201
144.html [https://perma.cc/D6GK-3B5U].
14. See id.
15. Kim Sung-Keun, Breaking: Regime’s Slush Fund Manager Defects in Vladivostok,
NEW FOCUS INT’L. Aug. 2016.
16. See Elias Groll, Gold Smuggling North Korean Diplomat Provides Glimpse at Crimi-
nal Empire, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 6, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/06/gold-
smuggling-north-korean-diplomat-provides-glimpse-at-criminal-empire/ [https://per
ma.cc/H5MB-BYEE].
17. See Leo Bryne, North Korea Uses “Multiple and Tiered” Techniques to Evade Sanc-
tions, NK NEWS (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.nknews.org/2014/03/north-korea-uses-
multiple-and-tiered-techniques-to-evade-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/L2SY-X7QB].
18. See Lisa Schlein, N. Korea Defectors Urge Switzerland to Freeze Leaders’ Funds,
VOICE OF AMERICA (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.voanews.com/a/north-korea-defectors-
urge-switzerland-to-freeze-leadership-money/2523035.html [https://perma.cc/H3S5-
YHXJ].
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Kim Jong-un reportedly requires diplomats and others who are posted
overseas to raise millions for celebrations and other activities that promote
the regime.19  Those posted overseas who are required to do so even
include military members of the Reconnaissance Bureau, a key special
operations force that is often involved in military proliferation to rogue
states on Pyongyang’s behalf.20  Recent activities show that there may be
trouble brewing in Office Number 39’s network.  During August of 2016, it
was reported that Thae Yong-ho, the DPRK Deputy Ambassador to the UK,
defected with $58 million.21  He is said to have been one of the managers
of Kim Jong-un’s secret money.  In June of that year, another official from
Office Number 39 defected in Europe.22  He allegedly made off with $400
million.  In 2015, an official from Office Number 39 defected and escaped
from China, and another escaped with millions from Singapore.23  In
2014, Yoon Tae-hyung, who was then in charge of the Russian branch of
Daesung Bank (a front bank for Office Number 39) escaped and defected—
taking five million dollars with him.24  These various defections by money
management personnel show three things; (1) there is a great deal of cor-
ruption  within North Korea’s illicit financial networks, (2) this corruption
likely has led top officials stealing money from the regime to ultimately
defecting in many cases, and (3) a great deal of fear still exists everywhere
in North Korea for anyone who crosses the regime, and even the members
of the elite who work within the shadow economy of Office Number 39 are
vulnerable.
If one examines North Korea’s spider web of global financial networks,
the result is quite fascinating.  It is essentially the first government run
highly sophisticated set of criminal financial networks in existence since
Nazi Germany.25  This is not an exaggeration.  The evidence shows that
Office Number 39 was founded specifically for the purpose of raising
funds for the regime.26  It is this series of networks, run like a modern day
crime family, that enables the DPRK to operate around the global financial
19. Elizabeth Shim, North Korea Requiring Diplomats to Raise Millions in U.S. Cur-
rency, UPI (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/09/29/
North-Korea-requiring-diplomats-to-raise-millions-in-US-currency/2841443540260/
[https://perma.cc/5E7G-NXCM].
20. See id.
21. See James Pearson & Ju-min Park, North Korea Deputy Ambassador in UK Defects
to South, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-de
fector/north-korea-deputy-ambassador-in-uk-defects-to-south-idUSKCN10S0CY [https://
perma.cc/LNK9-336V].
22. See Yi Whan-woo, N. Korea Leader’s Secret Funds Coming to Light, KOREA TIMES
(Aug. 21, 2016), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/08/485_
212381.html [https://perma.cc/LB88-ZP4S].
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See STAFF OF CONGRESSMAN EDWARD R. ROYCE, 110TH CONG., GANGSTER REGIME:
HOW NORTH KOREA COUNTERFEITS U.S. CURRENCY 15 (2007), http://royce.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/report.3.12.07.final.gansterregime.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BVZ-BZ7A].
26. See Brian Todd et al., North Korean Money Man Reveals Smuggling Operations,
CNN (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/politics/north-korea-defector-
ri-jong-ho/index.html [https://perma.cc/JYR2-HEUA].
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system, using phony front companies, empty banks, and conspiring indi-
viduals (including criminals) in nations all over the world.  Office Number
39 continues to operate around the world, constantly generating revenue
for Kim Jong-un’s slush funds, the North Korean military, and the elites
that continue to live in a high fashion.  But an examination of North
Korea’s financial networks is not enough.  In the next section, I will show
how North Korea gets around sanctions and counter-proliferation
initiatives.
II. How North Korea Gets Around Sanctions
North Korea has an efficient yet corrupt illicit financial system.  But in
order for the system to work, it must be able to get around the sanctions
and counter-proliferation regimes that the international community has
imposed on the DPRK.  This is not easy matter, but for many years, North
Korea has been able to get around banking regulations, unilateral sanctions
from several states, counter-proliferation initiatives imposed by the interna-
tional community, and UN sanctions that have become ever tougher and
broader with time.  The answer to how it has accomplished this success-
fully is complex and often confusing.  However, it is a necessary undertak-
ing to truly understand North Korea’s illicit activities, their proliferation,
and the vast set of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that Pyongy-
ang uses in order to protect its “business assets” overseas that are crucial to
the survival of the regime.
According to press sources in South Korea, sanctioned banks are very
clever in getting their funds into “legitimate” banks (these sanctioned
banks often have very little cash –  the key is getting money into a non-
sanctioned bank).27  More often than not, the targets are proven to be
smaller banks in China and elsewhere.28  Reportedly, this is because many
individuals in China are bribed to transfer the funds (those who are used
as “go-betweens” are said to get a fifteen to thirty percent cut, depending
on how strict sanctions or local law enforcement may be).29  North Kore-
ans transfer dollars to a Chinese intermediary, who then deposits the
funds into a small Chinese bank.  Many of North Korea’s funds are said to
be going through Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai.  In addition to indi-
viduals, front companies are often used— often these companies are used
only one time.30  According to a former North Korean diplomat who spoke
to the South Korean press, North Korean diplomats convert counterfeit
money into real money and then send it back to the DPRK.  North Korea is
27. See Kim Jong-Un’s Secret Billions, supra note 13.
28. See id.; China’s central bank tells banks to stop doing business with North Korea,
REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-
banks-china/chinas-central-bank-tells-banks-to-stop-doing-business-with-north-korea-
sources-idUSKCN1BW1DL [https://perma.cc/E9VS-7AE5].
29. See Ahn Sung-kyoo, North money laundering done in Guangdong, KOREA JOON-
GANG DAILY (June 5, 2013), http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.
aspx?aid=2972627 [https://perma.cc/V58H-SHFH].
30. See id.
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infamous for its “super notes,” counterfeit 100 dollar bills  so close to the
real thing it is almost impossible to tell the difference.31  The defector
described the modus operandi for the counterfeit exchange as such, “An
agent working at the embassy goes to a safe house and brings a box full of
them.  When the bills arrive, embassy staff bundle them up into $10,000
units.  They then travel to major cities in their host country to exchange
it.”32  By 2013, China was reported to have closed down the accounts of
North Korean entities in major banks, including Bank of China.33  Of
course, using the method above, North Korea could easily get around such
actions, as North Koreans typically use smaller banks anyway.
An excellent example of North Korean use of various resources and the
DPRK’s amazingly adept use of shell front companies, easily bribed indi-
viduals, and phony banks, lies in one of the few times the North Koreans
were actually caught— a shipment of arms to the Middle East caught in
Thailand in 2009.34  The shell companies for the operation were located in
16 countries, including New Zealand, Hong Kong, and Ukraine.  The
officers listed on the registration papers did not know the identities of the
real owners, their nationalities, or even where they were located.  They sim-
ply received their money and moved on.  The Russia-made cargo plane car-
rying the thirty-five-ton shipment was owned by an international arms
trafficker whose company was registered in the UAE.  A Georgian company
had the operating license for the aircraft.  The aircraft was then chartered
by a Hong Kong company.  After being chartered, the aircraft departed
Azerbaijan, eventually landing in Pyongyang.  From there, the aircraft
departed on the way to Tehran, where thirty-five tons of weapons such as
rocket propelled grenades, surface-to-air missiles, and many other light
arms were to be delivered to Hezbollah by the Iranians.  Non-North Korean
individuals who were involved in the operation knew almost nothing about
what was going on outside of their compartmentalized information sphere.
The front company in New Zealand listed a twenty-five-year old Chinese
immigrant as the Director, who held a day job at a Burger King in Auck-
land.35  It was only through luck and good intelligence work that the air-
31. Julian Ryall, Quality of fake ‘supernotes’ found in Seoul fan suspicions that North
Korea is forging $100 Bills, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2017/12/11/quality-fake-supernotes-found-seoul-fan-suspicions-north-korea/
[https://perma.cc/3WK3-VE77].
32. How N.Korean Diplomats Launder Counterfeit Money, CHOSUNILBO (Mar. 14,
2013), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/03/14/2013031401
253.html [https://perma.cc/8XCB-CVPZ].
33. China Probes N.Korea’s Bank Accounts, CHOSUNILBO (May 9, 2013), http://
english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/05/09/2013050901215.html [https://
perma.cc/84VE-WJRW]; Seoul Sounds Positive Note on Beijing’s Closure of N. Korea
Account, YONHAP (May 9, 2013), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/05/
09/53/0301000000AEN20130509008100315F.HTML [https://perma.cc/9F4H-AJB7].
34. Thomas Fuller & Choe Sang-Hun, Thais Say North Korea Arms Were Iran-Bound,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/world/asia/
01plane.html [https://perma.cc/HX7K-KBFS].
35. Nate Thayer, The Front Companies Facilitating North Korean Arms Exports, NK
NEWS (May 30, 2013), https://www.nknews.org/2013/05/the-front-companies-facilitat
ing-north-korean-arms-exports/ [https://perma.cc/2HXP-K5PN].
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-1\CIN102.txt unknown Seq: 9 30-AUG-18 15:06
2018 North Korean Illicit Activities and Sanctions 65
craft— which had landed in Thailand for refueling— was found and the
arms shipment stopped.  Otherwise, thirty-five tons of military gear, des-
tined for Hezbollah, would have arrived in the Middle East, furthering the
violent conflicts that have already caused many casualties.
During March of 2013, the South Korean and U.S. governments found
dozens of so called North Korean “dummy accounts” reportedly in China,
worth hundreds of millions of dollars.36  In 2014, Japanese police officials
disclosed that they had discovered an illegal North Korean account belong-
ing to a client of a firm in the Shizuoka Prefecture.37  The North Korean
Reconnaissance Bureau reportedly controlled the account through a Chi-
nese individual.  The funds from the account were then used for illegal
arms trading.38  This is another great example of North Koreans using eas-
ily bribed individuals to cover their illicit activities and proliferation
actions.  During 2014, the government of Singapore filed charges against
Chinpo Shipping Company Ltd., and the company was ordered to pay a
fine.39  Singapore has proven to be a key hub for North Korea’s prolifera-
tion and illicit activities— largely because of the lax banking laws and regu-
lations that make Singapore the “Switzerland of Asia.”  Due to a
technicality, Chinpo was able to successfully appeal the charges in 2017.40
North Koreans are said to use several different banks in Singapore.41
Revenues from transactions made with Iran are also reportedly laun-
dered through banks in Singapore.42  Citizens of African countries, such as
Zimbabwe, are often used as intermediaries (perhaps hundreds of them) to
launder the money for the North Koreans in banks located in Singapore.43
According to the UN Panel of Experts report released in early 2014, North
Korea is using “the complicated financial countermeasures and techniques
“pioneered by drug trafficking organizations. . . .”  The report also states,
“ . . . it found a relatively complex “ ‘corporate ecosystem’ of foreign based
firms and individuals that helped North Korea evade scrutiny of its assets
36. See Yongwon Yoo, Kim Jong-un’s Slush Funds Found, CHOSUNILBO (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/03/11/2013031101105.html
[https://perma.cc/QZH4-3ETA].
37. Suspected N. Korean Money Laundering Account Found in Japan, KBS WORLD
RADIO (Aug. 8, 2014), http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_In_detail.htm?No=
104522&id=IN [https://perma.cc/SG7N-PSDK].
38. Id.
39. Singapore Charges Company Over North Korea Weapons Role, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(June 10, 2014), https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/singapore-charges-company-over-
north-korea-weapons-role-576951 [https://perma.cc/B478-6U8F].
40. See Hamish Macdonald, Shipping Company Wins Appeal Over North Korea
Proliferation Conviction, NK NEWS (May 12, 2017), https://www.nknews.org/2017/05/
shipping-company-wins-appeal-over-north-korea-proliferation-conviction/ [https://
perma.cc/C6ZM-YJ6C].
41. Interview with Kim Kwang-jin, in Seoul, Republic of Korea (July 19, 2015)
(According to a former high-ranking North Korean defector, at least one of the banks in
Singapore that the North Koreans have used in the past in Singapore is United Overseas
Bank).
42. Interview with Anonymous, in Seoul, Republic of Korea (July 27, 2015) (A senior
Republic of Korea former government official who wished to remain anonymous).
43. Id.
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as well as its financial and trade dealings.”44
In 2017, it was revealed that North Korea’s “Glocom” and “Pan Sys-
tems” were in fact front companies operating in Singapore, and were used
to conduct DPRK military proliferation through a network of agents and
illicit bank accounts.45  Reportedly, “Pan Systems” also operates in Malay-
sia and China.46  “Pan Systems” and “Glocom” are said to operate under
the direction of North Korea’s Reconnaissance Bureau.47  North Korea’s
financial networks have also used Malaysia, a place that until recently had
no visa requirements for North Koreans as a key  operating base.  To quote
North Korean analyst Scott Snyder, “The visa-free access to Malaysia that
North Korean citizens have enjoyed until it was rescinded earlier this
month following the murder of Kim— the half-brother of the isolated
regime’s leader, Kim Jong Un— had provided Pyongyang with a base for
both illegal procurement and financing activities that have enabled it to
import sensitive materials and finance its WMD development.”48
According to a study by Hugh Griffiths and Lawrence Dermody con-
ducted for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
foreign companies and individuals, who travel on foreign passports, make
up the majority of sanctions violators of both individual unilateral nation-
states sanctions and UN sanctions.49  In other words, foreign individuals
and foreign front companies which operate on DPRK’s behalf commit the
majority of operations overseas that violate sanctions, international law,
and counter-proliferation initiatives.  This fact brings an interesting point
regarding sanctions and how they are targeted.  The SIPRI study found that
DPRK compensated third parties who carry out most of the activities con-
ducted on behalf of North Koreans in Pyongyang in the illicit under-
world.50  And yet, as of the date of the SIPRI’s study publication, almost all
of the sanctions had been focused on entities within DPRK.51  Given the
reality of the makeup of violators, the best way to pursue counter-illicit
operations would be targeting entities within foreign countries.  Unfortu-
nately, based on the nature of front companies and shell companies, as
44. James Pearson, Front Companies, Embassies Mask North Korean Weapons Trade -
U.N, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-korea-un/front
-companies-embassies-mask-north-korean-weapons-trade-u-n-idUSBREA2A080201403
11 [https://perma.cc/632F-8HWN].
45. James Pearson & Marius Zaharia, Singapore ‘Closely Studying’ U.N. Report on
North Korea Arms Trade, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
northkorea-singapore-arms/singapore-closely-studying-u-n-report-on-north-korea-arms-
trade-idUSKBN16G13S [https://perma.cc/W6KT-PQR5].
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Scott Snyder, Malaysia’s Front Office Role in Enabling North Korean WMD Pro-
curement, COUNCIL FOREIGN AFF.: ASIA UNBOUND (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/
blog/malaysias-front-office-role-enabling-north-korean-wmd-procurement [https://per
ma.cc/LWT2-KCJD].
49. See Hugh Griffiths & Lawrence Dermody, Loopholes in UN Sanctions Against
North Korea, 38 NORTH (May 6, 2014), http://38north.org/2014/05/griffithdermod
050614/ [https://perma.cc/F52J-DG64].
50. See id.
51. See id.
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well as compensated bribed individuals, this idea of targeting agents
outside of North Korea appears to be similar to a game of “whack-a-mole.”
According to the SIPRI study’s authors  referenced in the paragraph
above, North Korea is fully capable of operating outside of the interna-
tional system quite successfully, and as they state; “One reason is that the
sanctions have targeted North Korean companies and state institutions that
are impervious to sanctions because they are not embedded in the global
economy.”52  The authors also state, “North Korea-linked proliferation
activity is now firmly established beyond North Korea’s borders and some-
times beyond the borders of any regulated state, in what can be described
as the offshore economy: companies operating in deregulated business or
free-trade zones, ports and financial centers that have proved so conducive
to legitimate forms of international trade.  Shipments involve the outriders
of globalization: offshore bank accounts, flag-of-convenience ships and
passports, honorary consuls, free-trade zones and containerization.”53  As
former high-ranking U.S. government official Juan Zarate stated in a Con-
gressional testimony, “The North Korean schemes outside their borders
rely heavily on front companies, layered transactions, opaque ownership
structures, and trusted or corrupt relationships, making it difficult for legit-
imate banks and compliance systems to detect and stop its nefarious activi-
ties.”54  These various, often untraceable means are now better known to
analysts. More troubling, however, is the fact that North Korea now report-
edly  uses civilian airliners to transport illicitly gained hard currency.55  In
2015, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned individuals from North
Korea operating in Russia, Syria, and Vietnam.56  These sanctions clearly
reveal that North Korea’s spider web of operations is diverse, prosperous,
and capable of evading authorities— at least for an extended period of
time.57
In 2016, a compelling study by the UN Security Council Panel of
Experts shows that North Korea continues to successfully evade sanc-
tions.58  The study also shows that North Korea continues to use the inter-
52. Hugh Griffiths & Lawrence Dermody, Feb 13: Sanctions Beyond Borders: How to
Make North Korea Sanctions Work, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST. (Feb. 28, 2013),
https://www.sipri.org/node/329 [https://www.sipri.org/node/329].
53. Id.
54. Juan C. Zarate, Secondary Sanctions Against Chinese Institutions: Assessing Their
Utility for Constraining North Korea (May 10, 2017), https://www.banking.senate.gov/
public/_cache/files/32fc800c-312f-4e68-ad3f-3be5a6eae989/F5431B8F84661542DF
1C9C3E23CC102A.zarate-testimony-5-10-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2SV-DHVB].
55. See N. Korea Uses Civilian Airliners to Haul Hard Currency, CHOSUNILBO (July 3,
2015), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/07/03/2015070301475.
html [https://perma.cc/B9KU-XGAV].
56. Hamish Macdonald, U.S. Sanctions KPA Unit, Shipping Companies, N. Koreans
Overseas, NK NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.nknews.org/2015/12/u-s-sanctions-
kpa-unit-shipping-companies-n-koreans-overseas/ [https://perma.cc/Y29U-NX3W].
57. See id.
58. See Brian Padden & Margaret Besheer, UN Security Council Approves New Sanc-
tions on North Korea, VOICE OF AMERICA (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.voanews.com/a/un-
counts-the-ways-north-korea-evaded-sanctions/3215914.html [https://perma.cc/D3HX-
4VY6].
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national system and its many loopholes, to get around international
counter-proliferation initiatives.59  The report also points out that North
Korea continues to proliferate military gear in the Middle East and Africa,
among others.60  According to the UN report, analysts who closely follow
North Korean companies’ proliferation and illicit activities said that “[t]hey
adopted concealment techniques such as the use of foreign intermediaries,
front company networks and incomplete documentation.”61  Other high-
lights of the report shows that North Korea sent spare parts for ballistic
missiles (Scuds) to one of Washington’s allies— Egypt.62  This appears to be
on the cusp of changing.  In March of 2017, the U.S. State Department
sanctioned companies, entities including government entities, and individ-
uals in North Korea as well as China, Burma, Iran, Sudan, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Eritrea, and United Arab Emirates, for activities in violation of Sec-
tion 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act.63  Though
a small first step, going after front companies and individuals who are not
North Korean (often referred to as “secondary sanctions”) can be an effec-
tive way of containing North Korea’s illegal proliferation networks.64
Evidence that had been compiled over several years and was released
in 2016 showed that banks in Singapore and China cooperated with mem-
bers of the North Korean illicit financial network.65  The evidence also
showed that from the bank the “money trail” goes to Panama, where ship-
ping agents provided cover for North Korean activities— including prolifera-
tion.66  For example, a firm of Mossack Fonseca helped serve as a shipping
agent in Panama but reportedly did not realize that it was fronting for
North Koreans until 2010 when the firm stopped working for them.67
Often, the transactions appear to have gone through Chinese banks, such
as the Bank of China (which, of course, also has denied knowing the funds
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See Press Release, Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act Sanctions,
Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Mar. 24, 2017) https://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2017/03/269084.htm [https://perma.cc/5BUB-BNCQ].
64. See Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including
a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Mar. 30, 2017) https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/30/2017-06225/imposition-of-nonproli
feration-measures-against-foreign-persons-including-a-ban-on-us-government [https://
perma.cc/5EV7-9LE9]; see also Vivian Salama, US Imposes Sanctions on China, North
Korea Entities, People, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 24, 2017), https://apnews.com/
840c799486a6438391cc651d33a93b44 [https://perma.cc/VS84-CB8D]; see also Victor
Cha: US Sends ‘Secondary Sanctions’ Warning to China Through Blacklisting of NK Firm,
YONHAP NEWS (Apr. 3, 2017), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2017/04/
03/0401000000AEN20170403000400315.html [https://perma.cc/6K89-G976].
65. See Sungwon Yoon et al., How North Korea Funnels Cash Into the Country, BLOOM-
BERG (Feb. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-21/china-at-
the-heart-of-north-korea-s-illicit-cash-flow-funnel [https://perma.cc/E2R4-H44U].
66. See Mirren Gidda, Panama Papers: British Banker Helped North Korea Sell Arms,
Expand Nuclear Program, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/pana
ma-papers-mossack-fonseca-north-korea-444452 [https://perma.cc/UDW9-T3H8].
67. See id.
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were North Korean).68  Sophisticated networks that run through North
Korea, China, Singapore, and Panama, are only one example of how com-
plicated and difficult it is to track these activities because frequently, these
financial transactions run through intermediaries who are not North
Korean and thus often escape scrutiny initially.69  In March of 2017, the
United States Treasury Department levied sanctions against several North
Korean individuals involved in illicit financial activities supporting prolifer-
ation in diverse places, such as China, Russia, and Vietnam.70
In 2016, when North Korean entities were listed by the American Trea-
sury Department as a “primary money laundering concern,” many thought
that it might actually slow down the North’s proliferation and illicit activi-
ties.71  But not everyone concurred.  In referring to BDA (the Chinese bank
sanctioned by the United States in 2005— which set off a snowball effect on
North Korean illicit bank accounts all over Asia), Dr. John Park remarked,
“If you look at the BDA period . . . North Korea was caught off guard.  It
was a big shock to them.  But what comes out of that shock is that they
moved a lot of their banking activities inside of China and then they started
using private Chinese companies to do their activities in between them and
smaller banks.”72  The interview conducted with Dr. Park evolved into even
more compelling assessments.  As the interviewers stated, “Park said that
there are always Chinese middlemen and private firms who are willing to
do financial transactions on behalf of North Korea for money, and commis-
sion fees go up as sanctions on the regime in Pyongyang become tighter.”73
Dr. Park also made an interesting and important statement in his article
where he discussed the role of Chinese “middlemen,” intermediaries, for a
fee, help  North Koreans launder and mask the money used to carry out
illicit activities and proliferation.74  According to the article, “As sanctions
have become tougher, these local Chinese middlemen have charged higher
fees to reflect the elevated risk of doing business with North Korean clients.
Instead of hindering procurement activities, we found that sanctions have
actually helped to attract more capable middlemen, who are drawn by the
larger payday.”75
68. See Sungwon Yoon et al., supra note 65.
69. See id.; see also Mirren Gidda, supra note 66.
70. See Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Agents Linked to North Korea’s Weapons
of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Financial Networks, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Mar.
31, 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0039.aspx
[https://perma.cc/CT7X-T4V9].
71. See Chang Jae-soon & Roh Hyo-dong, U.S. Blacklisting of N.K. Unlikely to be as
Powerful as BDA Sanctions: Expert, YONHAP NEWS (June 12, 2016), http://english.yonhap
news.co.kr/news/2016/06/13/0200000000AEN20160613000300315.html [https://
perma.cc/8L93-KZRR].
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. John S. Park, To Curb North Korea’s Nuclear Program, Follow the Money, THE CON-
VERSATION (Sept. 20, 2016), http://theconversation.com/to-curb-north-koreas-nuclear-
program-follow-the-money-65462 [https://perma.cc/6L53-QCXD].
75. Id.
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Thus far I have not, at least in detail, discussed the methods by which
North Korea ships its weapons that bring in billions to Kim Jong-un’s cof-
fers.76  But when it comes to proliferation of arms to other nations, North
Korea has turned this into an art form.  In the early 2000s, the United
States helped create the Proliferation Security Initiative (“PSI”).77  The PSI
has, to date, been endorsed by more than 100 nations, and it frequently
focuses on maritime interdiction.78  This role is a noble effort, and yet, the
results have, at best, been mixed.79  North Korea has been proven quite
adept at getting around a variety of PSI methodologies of which one key
way is  using a legal loophole in maritime law, re-flagging of ships.80  In
2014, despite many sanctions including sanctioning North Korean
merchant ships, trade and proliferation did not slow down.81  The prolifer-
ation has continued because North Korea chose to use flags of convenience
to carry its goods and services to other nations, despite the fact that this
was banned by sanctions.82  In fact, Pyongyang has even utilized South
Korean ports during using this methodology.83  North Koreans used this
practice in collusion with front companies, to maintain their network of
merchant ships that proliferate and operate illegally in violation of interna-
tional sanctions.84  In 2015, disclosures indicated that North Korea was
using, at least, the flags of Mongolia, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Niue on its
merchant ships in defiance of sanctions.  In 2016, North Korea was
exposed as flying under the flag of Sierra Leone on some of its merchant
ships.  In the same year, nearly fifty North Korean ships were, reportedly,
flying under the flag of Tanzania.  This is undoubtedly only the tip of the
iceberg.  North Korea has, for many years, moved its merchant ships from
flag to flag in order to avoid detection.85  In 2017 the DPRK was caught
76. See Evelyn Cheng, Five Ways North Korea Gets Money to Build Nuclear Weapons,
CNBC (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/18/how-does-north-korea-get-
money-to-build-nuclear-weapons.html [https://perma.cc/D7EH-GYKF].
77. See Proliferation Security Initiative, U.S. DEP’T ST. (2016), https://www.state.gov/
t/isn/c10390.htm [https://perma.cc/HE6J-K23K].
78. Id.; Jofi Joseph, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Prolifer-
ation?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (June 1, 2004), https://www.armscontrol.org/print/1579
[https://perma.cc/8RQ2-DF7A].
79. Daniel W. Drezner, An Analytically Eclectic Approach to Sanctions and Nonprolifer-
ation, in Sanctions, Statecraft, And Nuclear Proliferation 161 (Etel Solingen ed., 2012).
80. See Leo Byrne, All Change: North Korean Ships Reshuffle their Identities, NK NEWS
(Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.nknews.org/2014/10/all-change-north-korean-ships-
reshuffle-their-identities/ [https://perma.cc/AS5Q-EHJS].
81. See Zeeshan Aleem, Here’s Why North Korea’s Economy is Able to Survive Sanction
after Sanction, VOX (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.vox.com/world/2017/12/7/16745692/
north-korea-sanctions-nuclear-economy [https://perma.cc/YLW4-N8L9].
82. See Byrne, supra note 80.
83. Murky Waters: North Korea’s Ships in South Korean Seas, NK NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014),
https://www.nknews.org/2014/11/murky-waters-north-koreas-ships-in-south-korean-
seas/ [https://perma.cc/8UAS-FN5W].
84. Id.
85. Andrea Berger, North Korea’s Friends in Singapore Running Flags of Convenience,
38 NORTH (June 22, 2015), http://38north.org/2015/06/aberger062215/ [https://
perma.cc/237E-8W5M]; N. Korea Runs 9 Merchant Ships Under Foreign Flags: Report,
YONHAP NEWS (Oct. 28, 2016, 11:53 AM), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/
10/28/33/0200000000AEN20161028004100315F.html [https://perma.cc/6VFC-
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proliferating weapons on a Cambodia flagged ship.86
As I have previously discussed in my book, The Last Days of Kim Jong-
il, the North Korean Threat in a Changing Era, a North Korean defector who
formerly worked within networks that conducted illicit arms deals, has dis-
closed to the press in South Korea that the DPRK’s arms dealers frequently
have been students at Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies.87  The edu-
cation trained them to be fluent in English and Chinese because Pyongy-
ang’s plan was to use these people to deal with “traders” in other countries.
According to the defector, a key method that Pyongyang has used to cir-
cumvent past sanctions is to transport containers across the Yalu River to
China, presumably under the cover of legal trade, of which one third or
half filled with weapons.  The defector stated that “[t]he forwarder who
received this cargo enters a port in a third country, where the containers
are filled with freight unrelated to weapons and the paperwork is com-
pleted.”  But this is not the end of the story.  The containers are then moved
to a third major port, one with heavy traffic.  Then “[t]he containers are
mixed with other cargo in those transit points.  They are searched, but not
thoroughly.”  As a former North Korean official reports, “[e]ven if customs
or other officials roll their sleeves up and search for weapons, how can they
possibly find the arms among the mountains of other containers headed to
other countries?”88  This method is one of the diverse ways that North
Korea gets around sanctions.
So far, we see a North Korean financial network that is so complex and
nuanced that it has baffled even the most sophisticated law enforcement
networks and international organizations.  North Korea has used and con-
tinues to use a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures to get around
sanctions and counter-proliferation initiatives.  These techniques at times
seem to be so clever that one wonders if the international community will
ever be able to truly restrain them.  Not the least of the reasons for this is
that the DPRK uses so many nearly untraceable foreign entities (under the
control of North Korea’s financial network managers) to conduct its trans-
actions and launder its money.  As Anthony Ruggiero of the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies stated in 2017 when speaking about the UN Panel
of Experts Report released early that year, “[t]he report highlights Pyongy-
ang’s habitual use of front companies with no visible ties to the regime, a
practice that the Treasury Department has called ‘a threat to the integrity of
4G5A]; see Elizabeth Shim, Report: North Korea Ships under Sierra Leone Flag Issued
Warning, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Mar. 25, 2016, 11:08PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News
/World-News/2016/03/25/Report-North-Korea-ships-under-Sierra-Leone-flag-issued-
warning/7471458960074/ [https://perma.cc/TR2B-TC4Y].
86. See Seana K. Magee, N. Korea Tactically Evading Sanctions on a Large Scale: U.N.
Report, KYODO NEWS (Feb. 8, 2017, 2:33 AM), http://abc140.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-
17001.html [https://perma.cc/4AGJ-5WT8].
87. See BRUCE E. BECHTOL, THE LAST DAYS OF KIM JONG-IL: THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT
IN A CHANGING ERA 117 (2013).
88. See id. at 117– 18; see also How N.Korea Goes About Exporting Arms, CHOSUNILBO
(Mar. 10, 2010, 12:29 PM), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/03/
10/2010031000953.html [https://perma.cc/KHJ5-DGKA].
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the U.S. financial system.’”89
The lack of enforcement of sanctions on North Korea by governments
all over the world, including China, the Middle East, and Africa, is high-
lighted by the words of Richard Nephew, when referring to the UN Panel of
Experts Report in early 2017.
The UNSC Sanctions Committee and UNSC more generally should consider
imposing sanctions, even if just targeted designations, on officials and enti-
ties involved in the willful refusal to implement UNSC sanctions.  Pertinent
examples could include the African nations who have continued to purchase
arms from North Korea as well as some of the traffickers described in the
report.  It is too much to expect that China or Russia would agree to impose
sanctions on entities or individuals operating in their own territory (and
there is more than a touch of hypocrisy involved in supporting designations
of citizens of other countries engaged in evasion), but they may be willing to
support certain other non-DPRK designations at this stage.90
As we move on to the next section, it is important to point out that these
constantly  evolving networks continue to create billions annually for the
Kim Family regime.
III. North Korean Non-Military Illicit Activities: Focus on Illegal
Drugs and Counterfeiting
North Korea has been able to successfully circumvent prohibited activ-
ity within the international, globalized system.  This shows the cleverness
of North Korean party members and leaders within the government.  It also
shows the long-range vision of Kim Il-sung, who even in the 1970s, foresaw
the weakness of the Soviet system and of his own, and tasked his son, Kim
Jong-il, to set up an illicit economic infrastructure that has survived and
even thrived for nearly fifty years.  This system has been able to bring in
billions annually for Kim Jong-un’s coffers.91  North Korea makes the larg-
est chunk of illicit money from proliferation, especially coming from the
Middle East such as Iran92 although another big chunk of illicit money
comes from conventional arms sales to several nations in Africa as well.93
But for the purposes of this Article, I will examine two key aspects of North
89. Anthony Ruggiero, UN Report Reveals North Korea’s Sanctions Evasion, FOUND.
DEF. DEMOCRACIES (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/
anthony-ruggiero-un-report-reveals-north-koreas-sanctions-evasion/ [https://perma.cc/
HTY8-C8TD].
90. Richard Nephew, Paper Tigers: DPRK POE Report Shows Deep Problems with
Enforcement, 38 NORTH (Mar. 16, 2017), http://38north.org/2017/03/rnephew031617/
[https://perma.cc/HP9X-KAE3].
91. See N.Korea’s Informal Economy Thrives, CHOSUNILBO (Nov. 16, 2013), http://
english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/11/16/2013111600456.html [https://
perma.cc/N82B-KRNG].
92. See Larry Niksch, The Iran-North Korea Strategic Relationship, 114TH CONG. (July
28, 2015), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20150728/103824/HHRG-114-
FA18-Wstate-NikschL-20150728.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8S8-SQZ6].
93. See Samuel Ramani, North Korea’s African Strategy, THE DIPLOMAT (July 15,
2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/north-koreas-african-strategy/ [https://
perma.cc/VW5M-YDLK].
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Korea’s illicit activities that are not related to military proliferation— illegal
drugs and counterfeit currency.  By examining these two key marketing
items in North Korea’s annual inventory of “bad deeds,” I will show how
truly unethical the government’s financing of these illicit financial net-
works can be.
According to a defector who wrote his testimony in 2012, the North
Korean government has an interesting methodology for sponsoring those
who run its opium industry (largely used for heroin according to most ana-
lysts).  According to the defector, “[t]he DPRK regime conducts its drugs
trade clandestinely, through what seems at first glance a legitimate com-
pany.  Situated Between Pyongyang’s Botong-gang Hotel and Chungru-
gwan is a gigantic building called ‘Ryugyong.’  It is the home of Ryugyong
Corporation, which trades under the auspices of the Party’s Foreign Rela-
tions Department.”  An article found in New Focus International cor-
roborates the defector’s testimony, stating “[w]ith the absolute support and
full protection of the regime, Ryugyong Corporation oversees the DPRK
drug industry and its production chain: from cultivation of opium plants to
point-of-sale.”94  Reportedly, opium drug dealers on the North Korea-China
border are overseen by Office Number 39, and the DPRK government is
also involved in its production and distribution.95  According to a variety of
sources including defectors’ testimonies, one of the key resources that
North Korea uses to distribute its illegal drugs is its diplomatic corps.96  As
diplomats work within North Korea’s illicit system, they naturally come
under the control of Office Number 39.  South Korean governmental
sources estimate North Korea’s annual illegal drug sales to overseas
amount up to $200 million.97  While North Korea has, over the years, made
drug sales based on traditional opium based drugs (largely heroin), the
biggest money-maker and the largest sales item for several years is now
Methamphetamines, sometimes known as “Ice.”98  North Korean opera-
tives are now known to be dealing with drug distribution organizations in
94. The DPRK is capitalist when it wants to be: the story of Drugs Incorporated, NEW
FOCUS INT’L (Aug. 18, 2012).
95. N. Korean Opium Floods Northeast China, CHOSUNILBO (Aug. 15, 2015),  http://
english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/08/15/2014081500517.html [https://
perma.cc/HEP9-KKS2].
96. See Julian Ryall, North Korea ‘Ramps Up Manufacture of Illegal Drugs’ Amid Sanc-
tions, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 21, 2017), http://www.dw.com/en/north-korea-ramps-up-
manufacture-of-illegal-drugs-amid-sanctions/a-40169753 [https://perma.cc/FW7P-
VFYZ]; see also Nathan Thompson, North Korea’s Got a Big Crystal Meth Problem, VICE
(Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mv578n/north-korea-crystal-
meth-drugs-diplomats-nathan-thompson [https://perma.cc/34ZE-8X3M].
97. N. Korean Diplomats ‘Sell Millions of Dollars’ Worth of Drugs’, CHOSUNILBO (Mar.
20, 2013),  http://www.neogaf.com/forum/showthread.php?t=527601 [https://
perma.cc/KP4B-KXDD].
98. See Avinash Tharoor, North Korea “Increasing Crystal Meth Production” Due to
Economic Sanctions, TALKING DRUGS (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.talkingdrugs.org/
north-korea-increasing-crystal-meth-production-to-economic-sanctions [https://perma.cc
/69B3-YBL2].
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Southeast Asia including Thailand.99  North Korean operatives also operate
on a large scale in China.100  Methamphetamines have reportedly become
more popular and profitable because the growing of opium has become
more difficult over the years with frequent tenuous crop conditions as well
as droughts and/or floods.101
The quality of the “Meth” coming out of North Korea is reportedly very
high.102  One would expect nothing less from a government sanctioned
and often sponsored business endeavor.  The finished product is report-
edly often smuggled into China, and then moved on to Shandong, and then
other provinces.103  From there, one presumes it likely moves on to places
like Southeast Asia and Japan.  Reportedly, in North Korea, the security
services are compliant with individual manufacturers who distribute the
drugs in China and North Korea.104  For those who are worried that North
Korea’s drug smuggling networks might reach all over Asia, and perhaps
even the United States, that train has already left the station.  According to
studies by Chinese scholars conducted in 2014, illegally manufactured
North Korean drugs are entering not only China, but also Japan regu-
larly.105  According to Zhang Li, a professor at the Peoples Public Security
University, North Korean drugs bound for foreign nations first enter China
by sea, and then are transferred to other ships, where they are then smug-
gled into countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Japan.106
Reportedly, the manufacture and sale of the drugs sold internationally are
under surveillance by Kim Jong-un’s henchmen.  This includes North
Korea’s overseas operations, where the handling of the drugs, and the sales
that follow are under close surveillance of Kim Jong-un’s security
people.107
Obviously, the North Koreans use a variety of means to generate hard
currency for the regime (military proliferation being the primary means,
99. Barbara Demick, In North Korea, Meth is Offered as Casually as a Cup of Tea, THE
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/world/in-north-kore
a-meth-is-offered-as-casually-as-a-cup-of-tea-20140128-hvabv.html [https://perma.cc/
85WR-4LSA].
100. Id.
101. Pierre Thomas et al., North Korea May be Pushing Meth into the United States,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/International/north-korea-pushing-
meth-united-states/story?id=20955416 [https://perma.cc/7ARJ-36KG]; see Isaac Stone
Fish, Inside North Korea’s Crystal Meth Trade, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 21, 2013), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/21/inside-north-koreas-crystal-meth-trade/ [https://perma.
cc/X9KZ-MHPG].
102. See Demick, supra note 99.
103. Yong-an Zhang, Drug Trafficking from North Korea: Implication for Chinese Policy,
BROOKINGS (Dec. 3, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/drug-trafficking-from-
north-korea-implications-for-chinese-policy/ [https://perma.cc/LX3V-NMD2].
104. Thompson, supra note 96.
105. N. Korean Stimulant Smuggling Networks Extend to Japan, Korea, INTELL ASIA
(Aug. 21 2014), http://www.intellasia.net/n-korean-stimulant-smuggling-networks-
extend-to-japan-korea-2-382493 [https://perma.cc/WZ4F-3PN2].
106. Id.
107. Oh Hyun Oo, Drug Trade Continues to Prove Lucrative, DAILY NK (Jan. 3, 2014),
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=11339&cataId=NK01500 [https://per
ma.cc/H8RM-3AQU].
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but other ancillary means are important as well).108  While illicit drug
activity is a fascinating case study (largely because this is the only illegal
drug network in the world actually sponsored by a sovereign government),
there are other means that are not related to military proliferation that
North Korea uses.  One of the key means among these other methods of
raising money is counterfeiting.  North Korean counterfeiting was consid-
ered a key threat to the international community during the 1990s and the
early 2000s.109  North Korean counterfeit 100-dollar bills, dubbed “super
notes” by U.S. authorizes, were of such fine quality because they were made
with the same material and printing tools as the real U.S. dollars.110  But in
2005, with the crack down on Banco Delta Asia by the Treasury Depart-
ment, some analysts assessed that North Korea had drastically pulled back
on its counterfeiting operations.111  Indeed, it did seem— at least based on
the number of incidents being reported— that North Korea had reduced its
counterfeiting operations after 2005.112  But in 2016, it appeared that
North Korea— perhaps out of a motivation to raise more cash for the
regime— was resuming its large-scale counterfeiting operations.113  In June
of 2016, press sources reported that North Korea appeared to be working
with both terrorist groups and international criminal organizations in
order to distribute counterfeit 100-dollar bills.114  Some analysts believe
this is— much like illegal drug sales— under the auspices of Office Number
39.115  According to North Korean defector Park Sang-hak, “Japanese
yakuza and terrorist groups in the Middle East, such as the Islamic State
may be among those who are circulating North Korea’s fake money.”116
108. See Mark Gollom, Drugs, Counterfeiting: How North Korea Survives on Proceeds of
Crime, CBC (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/north-korea-criminal-
empire-drugs-trafficking-1.4435265 [https://perma.cc/F3UL-NKAC].
109. See Bank of China in U.S. Sights over N. Korea Cash Flow, CHOSUNILBO (Sept. 8,
2005), https://web.archive.org/web/20070317014232/http://english.chosun.com/
w21data/html/news/200509/200509080007.html [https://perma.cc/4TDU-E57E]; see
also Stephen Mihn, No Ordinary Counterfeit, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 23, 2016), http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F06E0D61F30F930A15754C0A9609C8B63
&pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/6PSA-3RV6].
110. Tara Francis Chan, A $100 Counterfeit ‘Supernote’ Found in South Korea Could
Have Been Made in North Korea, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.business
insider.com/counterfeit-supernote-found-in-south-korea-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/
YKS6-GHCV]; Joshua McMorrow-Hernandez, Paper Money— Whatever Happened to
North Korean Counterfeit U.S. $100 Bills?, COIN WEEK (Mar. 29, 2016), https://
coinweek.com/people-in-the-news/crime-and-fraud/paper-money-whatever-happened-
north-korean-counterfeit-u-s-100-bills/ [https://perma.cc/669E-2W8M].
111. Greg Walters, North Korea’s Counterfeit Benjamins Have Vanished, VICE NEWS
(Mar. 16, 2016), https://news.vice.com/article/north-koreas-counterfeit-benjamins-have-
vanished [https://perma.cc/HF4C-5YJJ].
112. See McMorrow-Hernandez, supra note 111.
113. See Julian Ryall, North Korea May Have Resumed Counterfeiting Operation, THE
TELEGRAPH (June 28, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/28/north-
korea-may-have-resumed-counterfeiting-operation/ [https://perma.cc/PT2T-D6S4].
114. See Yi Whan-woo, N. Korea Selling Counerfeit Money to Terrorists, KOREA TIMES
(June 27, 2016), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/06/485_20
7990.html [https://perma.cc/83JU-YJAA].
115. See id.
116. Id.
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Sales and attempted sales of counterfeit American currency may have been
a reflection of North Korean efforts to raise more money for the regime
during 2016 when international pressure reached a new high.117
Illicit drugs and counterfeit currency are only two types of illicit and
illegal trade that North Korean engages in.  They are particularly interest-
ing ways of raising money for the regime because it is so unambiguously
clear that they are— without a doubt— criminal activities carried out with
the consent and support of the very top leaders in the North Korean gov-
ernment.  There are other types of illicit activities in which the regime
engages.  These activities, including those described earlier, are designed
by entities who answer largely to Office Number 39, exclusively for the
purposes for raising money for the regime.118  These activities are impor-
tant and raise significant cash for the regime.  But it should be pointed out
that the most important illicit money maker (probably by far) for the
regime is the military proliferation it conducts, especially in the Middle
East and Africa.  To quote what North Korean military proliferation
encompasses:
It essentially involves four efforts: (1) WMD and the platforms to carry it
(ballistic missiles), (2) Conventional Weapons sales, (3) Refurbishment of
Soviet era weapons for countries that still use them, and (4) Technical and
Military assistance and advising.  Some have suggested that because North
Korea has partially adjusted its tactics, techniques and procedures by actu-
ally building facilities (usually actual factories) where countries can assem-
ble WMD, related platforms, and conventional weapons systems, that this
somehow means the proliferation has “declined.”  In fact, the opposite is
true.  North Korea builds these facilities for countries like Syria, Iran, and
non-state actors such as Hezbollah, and then remains on board to maintain
and supervise assembly of weapons systems— with parts (less detectable
than entire systems) that continue to roll in from North Korea.119
IV. How Has the USA Taken Action to Stop North Korea’s Illicit
Activities and Proliferation?
The United States has conducted a variety of initiatives and sanctions
that have been designed to counter North Korea’s illicit and illegal activities
and the financial networks that support these activities.  While some of
these initiatives and sanctions have been less then successful, I would
assess that the reasons, for many years now, have been largely because of
difficulties in enforcement, not because the sanctions and initiatives did
not have the potential to legitimately contain North Korea’s criminal and
“sanctions busting” actions.  The way America’s actions have evolved dur-
117. See Brian R. Moore & Riza De Los Reyes, What’s Behind North Korea’s Recent
Counterfeiting?, THE DIPLOMAT (July 6, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/whats-
behind-north-koreas-recent-counterfeiting/ [https://perma.cc/68HT-AJ74].
118. See Christina Gathman, Inside North Korea’s State-Sanctioned Criminal Empire,
23 INT’L AFF. REV. 58, 60– 63 (2014).
119. See Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Military Proliferation in the Kim Jong-un Era: The Impact
on Human Rights in North Korea, 18 INT’L J. KOR. STUD. 91, 98– 99 (2014).
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ing recent years, and how they can continue to improve is what I will
address here in this section.
During 2013, it became obvious that Washington would go after indi-
viduals and front companies that supported North Korea’s illicit actions, or
who profited from them, when the Obama administration sanctioned Bur-
mese General Thein Htay for buying North Korean missile equipment (the
General was at the time, the head of a missile research and development
facility).120  In 2013, after the Obama administration had initiated a num-
ber of sanctions against various North Korean entities, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed a bill more stringent than other sanctions.  The bill
brought about new banking restrictions.  The new legislation denied North
Koreans or any of the third party cohorts, all access to American property
or banking institutions, and perhaps as importantly, allowed Washington
to sanction any third parties— or banks— that facilitate North Korean illicit
activities and/or human rights abuses.121  In August of 2014, the U.S. Trea-
sury Department issued an “Advisory on Financial Transactions” with the
DPRK.122  This came in the wake of an earlier initiative that came out of the
Financial Action Task Force, an international body with thirty-four mem-
ber jurisdictions that put North Korea on a list of nations in need of
improved countermeasures against terrorist financial transactions and
money laundering.123  The Treasury Department advisory urged financial
institutions to consult existing guidance on any transactions that had the
possibility of involving North Korea.124
In early January of 2015, in what many analysts thought was an Amer-
ican reaction to a North Korean cyber-attack launched against Sony, the
Treasury Department took financial action against North Korean govern-
ment agencies and ten individuals.125  The individuals were at the time
reported to be operating out of such diverse places as China, Syria, Iran,
and Russia.126  The sanctions also were noteworthy because they included
Korea Mining Development Corporation, the Tangun Trading Corporation,
and even the elite special operations forces of the Reconnaissance Bureau,
120. See Paige Gance, Obama Administration Sanctions Myanmar General for Dealings
with North Korea, REUTERS (July 2, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sanc
tions/obama-administration-sanctions-myanmar-general-for-dealings-with-north-korea-
idUSBRE9610QF20130702 [https://perma.cc/AHU4-VPT7].
121. See Ed Royce: New North Korean Sanctions Will Sting, KOREA TIMES (July 30,
2014), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/07/485_161957.html
[https://perma.cc/4XPV-57SX].
122. See Yonho Kim, US Treasury Issues Advisory on Financial Transactions with N.
Korea, VOICE OF AMERICA (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.voanews.com/a/us-treasury-
issues-advisory-on-financial-transactions-with-north-korea/2406604.html [https://
perma.cc/D52K-RBLR].
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Carol Morello & Greg Miller, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on N. Korea Following
Attack on Sony, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/us-imposes-sanctions-on-n-korea-following-attack-on-sony/2015/01/0
2/3e5423ae-92af-11e4-a900-9960214d4cd7_story.html?utm_term=.1f4f4287ddc7 [http:
//perma.cc/6E8F-8W6Q].
126. See id.
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showing once again the dynamic between government trading organiza-
tions and the military in proliferation and even illicit activities and bank-
ing.127  This was followed up in March of 2015, when the U.S. Treasury
Department issued another advisory naming North Korea as a country
with high risk for money laundering and terrorist financing.128
After all of the actions initiated above— all with good reason and ample
evidence— in June of 2015, the United States State Department once again
left North Korea off of the list of nations sponsoring terrorism.129  Regard-
ing the decision, the U.S. State Department clarified that North Korea “is
not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a
Korean Airlines flight in 1987.”130  This is, in my assessment, an interest-
ing statement, given the evidence that shows North Korea has supported—
and continues to actively support terrorist designated groups such as
Hezbollah and Hamas.131  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated, “[t]he
fact is that North Korea continues to smuggle missiles and weapons to
other countries around the world— Burma, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas— and
they continue with their development of their nuclear program.”132  It is
also interesting given the wording that the Treasury Department used in its
advisories during 2014 and 2015.133  Despite the State Department’s
rather confusing “non-designation” on North Korea, the sanctions contin-
ued in 2015, largely because of North Korean proliferation.  In November
of that year, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control
(OFAC), which publishes a list of individuals and entities that act on behalf
of targeted countries (e.g. North Korea), released a list of four new individ-
uals who were designated as supporting activities already sanctioned.134
Two of these individuals were working for KOMID (a widely known
proliferation front company already sanctioned) and one is known to have
worked for Office Number 39.135  In December of 2015, the United States
127. See id.; see also Press Release, Treasury Department Sanctions Against the Gov-
ernment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 2,
2015), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9733.aspx; see also
Editorial, Coordinated Position: Pyongyang’s Outmoded Tactics will not Pay Off, KOREA HER-
ALD (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150116000387
[https://perma.cc/PBF6-7QEB].
128. See U.S. Issues New Advisory on Financial Deals with N. Korea, KOREA HERALD
(Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150318000713 [https://
perma.cc/5BBB-S84L].
129. See U.S. Leaves out N. Korea from Terrorism Sponsors List, YONHAP (June 2, 2015),
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/06/03/26/0301000000AEN20160603
000200315F.html [https://perma.cc/P5NS-T28L].
130. Id.
131. See Jim Geramone, Gates Gives Frank Assessments of World Trouble Spots,
DEFENSE NEWS (Aug. 13, 2010), http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id
=60425 [https://perma.cc/74LA-RVLN].
132. Id.
133. Kim, supra note 123; U.S. TREASURY DEP’T., supra note 128.
134. See Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Supporters of North Korea’s Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Illicit Finance Networks, U.S. DEP’TTREASURY (Nov. 13, 2015),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0269.aspx [https://per
ma.cc/79DW-5WUJ].
135. See id.
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initiated new sanctions against North Korea.  This time, another major mili-
tary entity was targeted (probably for proliferation)— the Strategic Rocket
Forces.136  Banks and front companies also again came under scrutiny and
were the targets of action, as well as North Korean citizens who were based
in places like Syria and Vietnam137 (Vietnam has a very lax banking
system).138
A variety of interesting developments in 2016 impacted the possible
U.S. reactions to North Korean activities.  Clearly North Korea’s prolifera-
tion and other illicit activities had caught the attention of both the White
House and Congress.  On March 16th of 2016, the President issued an
Executive Order regarding North Korea.139  The order blocked the property
of the North Korean government and the party, and prohibited several
types of transactions that North Korea had used to get around sanctions in
the past.  Some highlights of the new Executive Order included, “[a]ll prop-
erty and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter
come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the
possession or control of any United States person of the Government of
North Korea or the Workers’ Party of Korea are blocked and may not be
transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.”140  In addi-
tion, the following things were prohibited:
(i) the exportation or reexportation, direct or indirect, from the United
States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, ser-
vices, or technology to North Korea;
(ii) new investment in North Korea by a United States person, wherever
located; and
(iii) any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a United States
person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the
transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by this section if
performed by a United States person or within the United States.141
Finally, the Executive Order also asserts a very important measure:
The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is
hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules
and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA
and the UNPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order.
The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other
officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with appli-
cable law.  All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed
to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provi-
136. See US Expands North Korea Sanctions Over Arms Trade, BBC (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35048138 [https://perma.cc/8MYQ-PL5B].
137. See id.; see also US Sanctions North Korea Over Arms Trade, AFP (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3351645/US-sanctions-N-Korea-arms-
trade.htm [https://perma.cc/SRQ5-UYVH].
138. See Vietnam - Banking Systems, EXPORT.GOV (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.export.
gov/article?id=Vietnam-Banking-Systems [https://perma.cc/T9Y9-7Z69].
139. Exec. Order No. 13722, 81 Fed. Reg. 14943 (Mar. 15, 2016).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 14944.
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sions of this order.142
Despite the many sanctions and other actions taken by Washington,
reports that assessed the impact of these actions on North Korea showed
that Pyongyang appeared to be accomplishing its goals.143  For example,
according to reports coming out of Northeast Asia, prices of commodities
in North Korea did not seem to be affected by the sanctions in 2016— years
after many sanctions had been imposed by the USA (as well as financial
initiatives imposed by the U.S. Treasury Department).144  Despite ques-
tions about the reports’ validity, Washington continued to act.  In June of
2016 (in an action related to the initiative taken in November of the same
year), the U.S. Treasury Department declared that North Korea is a jurisdic-
tion of “primary money laundering concern,” under the Patriot Act, section
311.145  The designation was particularly important because it forbade
third country banks to use U.S. bank accounts to process financial transac-
tions for the DPRK.146  This could have made, though its impact on this is
unclear, foreign banks vulnerable to U.S. sanctions if they did business
with North Korea.147  In September of 2016, the U.S. House of Representa-
tives introduced legislation that would ban North Korea from engaging in
the worldwide bank transfers through electronic funds system, such as the
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications
(“SWIFT”).148  SWIFT’s system regulations are controlled out of Belgium.
Thus, it would take European cooperation for an eventual shut-down of
North Korean accounts utilizing this system.149  For anyone who has trans-
ferred electronic funds to a bank overseas, this system is quite familiar.
Korean specialist Scott Snyder stated in September of 2016 that target-
ing small and medium Chinese enterprises that continue to do business as
usual with North Korea was one way, out of four that he mentioned, to
strengthen sanctions against North Korea.  There are companies similar to
the Hongxiang group that play a gateway role for both legitimate trade and
142. Id. at 14945.
143. See Impact of Int’l Sanctions on N. Koreans Remain Minimal: RFA, YONHAP (May
29, 2016), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/05/29/33/0401000000
AEN20160529004100315F.html [https://perma.cc/BYS9-TM99].
144. See id.
145. Press Release, Treasury Takes Actions to Further Restrict North Korea’s Access to
the U.S. Financial System, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (June 1, 2016), https://www.treasury.
gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0471.aspx [https://perma.cc/6W5K-D2LB].
146. Id.
147. See id.; see also Matthew Pennington, US Designates North Korea ‘Primary Money
Laundering Concern’, AP (June 2, 2016), https://apnews.com/5cbca899f29c4be298
466f08b9219768 [https://perma.cc/H23Z-ADYZ]; see also Matthew Pennington, US
Lawmakers Take Aim at North Korea Over Terrorism, AP (June 16, 2016), https://
apnews.com/3ed444f0361b4e4fbaedd8ba6eebe6d2 [https://perma.cc/X77H-ZHH9];
see also Patricia Zengerle, U.S. Takes Further Steps to Block North Korea’s Access to Finan-
cial System, REUTERS (June 2, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-
treasury-idUSKCN0YN4TM [https://perma.cc/L7VJ-E8XZ].
148. See U.S. to Shutter North’s Overseas Banking, JOONGANG ILBO (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3024297 [https://
perma.cc/7L5E-E9V2].
149. See id.
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embedded North Korean procurement of dual use items.”150  He also
stated in part to “Push Chinese authorities to crack down Chinese banks
that deal with North Korean citizens since they use multiple personal
accounts containing millions of dollars for state purposes.  Since opening
an account requires identification, Chinese authorities should be able to
identify and cut off all North Korean account holders. If necessary, impose
secondary sanctions on these banks.”151  In November of 2016, the United
States Treasury Department finalized actions restricting North Korea’s
access to the U.S. financial system.152  According to the press release from
the Treasury Department, “North Korea continues to use front companies
and agents to conduct illicit financial transactions— some of which support
the proliferation of WMD and the development of ballistic missiles— and
evade international sanctions,” said Adam J. Szubin, Acting under the Sec-
retary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.153  He further stated
“[s]uch funds have no place in any reputable financial system.”154  In
December of 2016, in reaction to North Korea’s nuclear test and involve-
ment in proliferation, Washington sanctioned 16 North Korean companies
and seven individuals.155
2017 brought in a new administration and a new philosophy about
dealing with North Korea’s proliferation and illicit financial networks.  On
August 22, 2017, the Treasury Department designated (sanctioned) several
entities and individuals “in response to North Korea’s ongoing develop-
ment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), violations of United Nation
(UN) Security Council resolutions, and attempted evasion of U.S. sanc-
tions.”  The report went on to say in part, “Today’s sanctions target third-
country companies and individuals that (1) assist already-designated per-
sons who support North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile pro-
grams . . .” The report designated entities and individuals in Russia, China,
and even Namibia.156  In September, 2017, it was announced that the U.S.
Treasury Department was taking further actions against North Korean enti-
ties and banks— including those doing business with third party banks and
front companies, at least one of which were located in Singapore.157
150. Scott Synder, Four Ways to Unilaterally Sanction North Korea, COUNCIL ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/blog/four-ways-unilaterally-sanc
tion-north-korea [https://perma.cc/VKK2-N9KS].
151. Id.
152. Press Release, Treasury finalizes Action to Further Restrict North Korea’s Access
to the U.S. Financial System, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.treas
ury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0603.aspx [https://perma.cc/QTF9-NAZP].
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. U.S. Sanctions North Korean Companies, Officials After Nuclear Test, REUTERS
(Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-northkorea-treasury-idUSKBN
13R1YD [https://perma.cc/C52T-NJV3].
156. See “Treasury Targets Chinese and Russian Entities and Individuals Supporting
the North Korean Regime,” U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Aug. 22, 2017),  https://www.treas
ury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0148.aspx [https://perma.cc/SUA6-AS
GN].
157. See Elizabeth Shim, North Korea Banks Under U.S. Sanctions Have Partners in
China, Singapore, UPI (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/
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In late September of 2017, it was publicly announced that months ear-
lier, President Trump had signed an executive order expanding the author-
ity of both the State and Treasury Departments to target both entities and
individuals trading with North Korea, and banks that are running the dirty
money.  Trump was quoted in a press conference as saying, “The new exec-
utive order will cut off sources of revenue that fund North Korea’s efforts to
develop weapons of mass destruction.”  He further stated, “For far too long,
North Korea has been allowed to abuse the international financial system
to facilitate funding for its nuclear weapons and missile programs.”158
Later that year, in October, 2017, the UN Panel of Experts identified fifty-
seven Chinese, Malaysian, and North Korean companies that have helped
North Korea evade sanctions and financed its WMD programs.  Of the
companies, forty-three had yet to be sanctioned at the time— opening up
new opportunities to be exploited by the US.  The networks of banks, front
companies, and phony financial entities reportedly was (and likely is)
operating in China, Malaysia, Singapore, and countries in Africa.159  The
renewed pro-active engagement with the international community to pres-
sure the DPRK began paying dividends on a small scale almost immedi-
ately.  There was initial pressure from the U.S. to get North Koreans off of
re-flagged ships (Fiji being a key example).  In addition, the pressure on
nations with North Korean embassies was intensified, with Mexico, Peru,
Spain, and Kuwait among others, all expelling their DPRK ambassadors.
The requests from the U.S. to various nations were reportedly targeted and
quite specific.160
As reported on November 2, 2017, the U.S. officially cut the Bank of
Dandong off from the American financial system that same month.
According to the Wall Street Journal, the bank is the 148th largest out of
196 banks in the Chinese sector.  This is an excellent first step, but there is
no doubt several other banks within the Chinese sector need to be
addressed.  Going after banks that launder North Korea’s dirty money is
important— though a report by the think tank Center for Advanced Defense
Studies (C4ADS) in Washington DC, suggests that— at least in China—
North Korea’s financial holdings and laundered money are far more vulner-
able to targeting by U.S. and international agencies than many would
think.  As the report states in its executive summary, “Today the regime is
dependent on the flow of hard currency to function.  Maintaining the
access and evading international sanctions have required the regime’s for-
2017/09/27/North-Korea-banks-under-US-sanctions-have-partners-in-China-Singapore/
6171506530537/ [https://perma.cc/6U3Z-ZCHP].
158. Ryan Pickrell, Trump’s Exec Order on North Korea is a Big Step that Should have
been Taken Years Ago, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 23, 2017), http://dailycaller.com/2017/09/23
/trumps-exec-order-on-north-korea-is-a-big-step-that-should-have-been-taken-years-ago/
[https://perma.cc/XHG6-3Q6S].
159. Sarah Kim, “As UN Names Firms Aiding North, U.S. Seeks More Sanctions,”
KOREA JOONGANG DAILY (Oct. 9, 2017), http://mengnews.joins.com/view.aspx?aId=3039
187 [https://perma.cc/T86Q-JRXG].
160. Paul Sonne & Felicia Schwartz, U.S. Pressure on North Korea’s Global Ties Bears
Fruit, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2017),  https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-department-pres
sure-on-north-koreas-global-ties-bears-fruit-1507492004 [https://perma.cc/P8AV-9YAT].
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eign exchange banks to offshore critical financial infrastructure overseas.
The resulting illicit overseas networks play a vital role as proxies for the
North Korean banking and foreign exchange systems.  However, being inte-
grated into the international systems of banking, commerce and logistics,
leaves these networks exposed to international law enforcement actions.161
During November, 2017, in a long overdue move, the United States
redesignated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.  This is not only
an important political move because of all of the legitimate moves that it
allows nation-states to make against North Korea’s rogue state illicit arms
deals, but a move that completely discredits that move made by the George
W. Bush administration in 2008, simply because it was thought to be an
initiative that would bring Pyongyang back to the bargaining table (which
it did, accomplishing nothing).  North Korea should be and always should
have been on the list of nations that are state sponsors of terrorism because
it is and has been for many years since before the Cold War and following
its conclusion, a state sponsor of terrorism.162
As this section has hopefully shown, North Korea has not slowed
down its proliferation activities, its illicit activities, or its involvement in the
international banking system, despite a variety of sanctions and other
actions targeting Pyongyang’s activities.  This is not a result of the United
States’ failure to take measures or impose sanctions on North Korea.
Rather, it is because, until January 2017, the plethora of actions taken by
the United States has all had one major issue that takes away from their
effectiveness— enforcement.  While the actions taken have all looked good
on paper, they are no more useful than the paper they are printed on unless
the initiatives are actually acted upon.  For the most part, this did not hap-
pen during the Obama Administration.163  It is unfortunate, because some
of these sanctions could have truly put North Korea in a place that made
the government vulnerable to the international community’s actions.  As
Korean specialist Bruce Klingner has stated, “[e]ven the most reclusive
regime, criminal organization or terrorist group is tied to the global finan-
cial order.  Dirty money eventually flows across borders and— given that
the U.S. dollar serves as the global reserve currency— ninety-five percent of
all international financial transactions are denominated in dollars.  As
such, virtually all international transactions must pass through a U.S. Trea-
161. See Ian Talley, Treasury Blocks Chinese Bank From U.S. Financial System Over
North Korea Ties, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-
blocks-chinese-bank-from-u-s-financial-system-over-north-korea-ties-1509667328 [https:/
/perma.cc/CHP5-NZXN]; The Forex Effect, CTR ADVANCED DEFENSE STUD. (Dec. 12,
2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5a
3292079140b73f73f92efd/1513263687907/The+Forex+Effect.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S9WB-2ZF2].
162. See Lee Haye-ah, U.S. Designates N. Korea as State Sponsor of Terrorism, YONHAP
(Nov. 21, 2017), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2017/11/21/0301000000
AEN20171121000355315.html [https://perma.cc/DP2L-987D].
163. See Krishnadev Calamur, The Options That Have Been Tried on North Korea So
Far, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2017/09/north-korea-nuclear/538803/ [https://perma.cc/46ZN-75V3].
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sury Department-controlled bank account in the United States.”164
The initiatives taken by the Trump administration during 2017 are
important and relevant.  Yet, these initiatives and actions taken need to be
stepped up and initiated in a comprehensive manner.  This is not a criti-
cism, but simply a lesson learned from past lessons of North Koreans
issues.  Unless or until these actions are taken in a way that puts pressure
on all North Korean proliferation, illicit trade, and illegal bank accounts
and front companies, Pyongyang will simply morph its modus operandi
once again and continue to function in a way that will allow military
proliferation and other activities to flourish.  As we move through 2018
and 2019, we may very well see stepped up pressure on North Korea, to
include working with our allies to achieve diplomatic isolation, and work-
ing with the international community to order to contain and suppress
Pyongyang’s sophisticated illicit financial networks supporting its military
proliferation and other illicit activities.  It is important to keep in mind that
that the threat from North Korea’s conventional and WMD associated pro-
grams is every bit as compelling because of proliferation— or more— as it is
because of potential conflict in the region in which the DPRK sits.
V. How has the International Community Taken Action Regarding
DPRK Illicit Activities?
Ever since the very first nuclear crisis culminated in the 1994 “Agreed
Framework” that Froze Pyongyang’s plutonium nuclear program, the inter-
national community has attempted to take action against North Korea in
ways that would truly impact the regime.165  In fact, North Korea’s success-
ful dance with the international community regarding its nuclear and mis-
sile programs and its attempts to get around sanctions, have often been
compared with Iran’s recent talks that resulted in the “JCPOA” in 2015.166
I have already addressed several initiatives (such as PSI) that have been
attempted to either coerce North Korea into changing its rogue state behav-
ior, or to contain that behavior via non-kinetic means.  In this section, I will
look at the highlights in recent years.  This international activity has fre-
quently been conducted through the UN, and thus this has dominated
much of the international and multinational action taken against the
DPRK.
In early March of 2013, in what came as a surprise to many analysts,
China was able to reach an agreement with American officials to draft a
164. Bruce Klingner, Debunking Six Myths About North Korean Sanctions, THE DAILY
SIGNAL (Dec. 22, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/2014/12/22/debunking-six-myths-
north-korean-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/L53C-CMUD].
165. See Curtis H. Martin, Lessons of the agreed framework for using engagement as a
nonproliferation tool, 6 THE NONPROLIFERATION REV., 35, 35– 37 (1999).
166. JCPOA stands for, “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” and was the agreement
signed with Iran in 2015, freezing its nuclear weaponization program.  It has often been
compared to the North Korean series of talks. See Thomas Ricks, To start talks with
North Korea, look to the Iran deal —  but don’t hold your breath, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 12,
2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/12/to-start-talks-with-north-korea-look-to-the-
iran-deal-but-dont-hold-your-breath/ [https://perma.cc/K22N-BEK2].
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resolution that targeted North Korea’s illicit trade.167  The agreement
targeted “the illicit activities of North Korea’s diplomats, banking relation-
ships, and illicit transfers of bulk cash.”168  Later in the month, Japan and
Australia sanctioned North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank (“FTB”).169  In
April of 2013, the United States Treasury Department publicly encouraged
other nations to join them in sanctioning FTB.170  In May of 2013, the
Bank of China announced that it would sever ties with FTB (though as I
have stated earlier, North Korea is known to typically use smaller banks in
China).171
In February and March of 2015, the international body known as the
Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) called on North Korea to combat
money laundering.172  This call was supported by the United States Trea-
sury Department and passed on in one of its “Financial Advisories.”173
Later in that year, in late June, the international anti-money laundering
organization (“FATF”) warned all 34 member states that they “should pay
‘special attention’ to financial transactions with North Korea.”174  As 2015
turned into 2016, the FATF issued another important report.  This time,
the international body highlighted, among others, Iran and North
Korea.175  The FATF “expressed concern about ‘significant deficiencies’ in
North Korea’s systems.”176  The organization “specifically warned member
agencies to ‘protect against correspondent relationships being used to
bypass or evade counter-measures’ and to be wary when considering
requests to allow North Korean financial institutions to open branches or
subsidiaries in their countries.”177  In 2016, following another nuclear test,
167. See Parameswaran Ponnudurai, Global Bid to Cripple North Korea’s Illicit Trade,
RADIO FREE ASIA (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/illicit-03
052013150916.html [https://perma.cc/7Y4S-LEL2].
168. Id.
169. Antoni Slodkowski & Warren Strobel, Japan, Australia to sanction North Korean
bank as part of U.S.-led crackdown, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-korea-north-bank-idUSBRE92P04T20130326 [https://perma.cc/SND7-45EV].
170. See Margaret Brennan, U.S. Urges Nations to Cut North Korea’s Financial Link,
CBS NEWS (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-urges-nations-to-cut-
north-koreas-financial-link/ [https://perma.cc/SC3T-Q74J].
171. Yang Jung A, Banks Put a Big Fly in NK Ointment, DAILYNK (May 9, 2013), http://
www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=NK00400&num=10560 [https://perma.cc/
VH3R-M5C9].
172. See Kim Yonho & Jee Abbey Lee, Money-Laundering Watchdog Calls On North
Korea to Fulfill Pledge, VOICE OF AMERICA (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.voanews.com/a/
money-laundering-watchdog-calls-on-north-korea-to-fulfill-pledge/2665115.html [https:/
/perma.cc/789G-YG8V].
173. Advisory on the FATF-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFG Deficiencies, U.S.
DEP’T TREASURY (2015), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/advisory-fatf-iden
tified-jurisdictions-amlcft-deficiencies [https://perma.cc/LGL9-RW3C].
174. See Kim Yonho & Jee Abbey Lee, Watchdog Warns of N. Korea Money Laundering,
VOICE OF AMERICA (June 29, 2015), http://www.voanews.com/a/watchdog-warns-of-
north-korea-money-laundering/2842448.html [https://perma.cc/8D34-VQ2M].
175. See Mark Hosenball, Anti-Money Laundering Body Urges More Scrutiny of Iran,
REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-economy-money-
laundering-idUSKCN0VS2LM [https://perma.cc/62U3-SRMX].
176. Id.
177. Id.
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the UN imposed new sanctions on North Korea.178  In fact, the UN has
imposed several separate sanctions measures since North Korea began its
rogue state behavior— particularly nuclear testing.179  The sanctions
imposed on North Korea in March of 2016 involved harsh new regulations
about cargo inspections and targeting of North Korean agents of trade in
places such as Syria, Iran, and Vietnam.180  The sanctions truly went after
trade between the DPRK and any nations belonging to the UN.181  Unfortu-
nately, the sanctions had several loopholes that countries such as China
could exploit.182  In addition, many nations trading with North Korea
(such as Iran) simply ignore UN sanctions at will.183
During October of 2016, the FATF took further action against North
Korea, and alerted nations all over the world (specifically FATF member
states) to terminate any relationships with North Korean financial institu-
tions.184  According to a South Korean press piece, which quoted the offi-
cial announcement, “FATF has serious concerns about the threat posed by
DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) and its financing,”and “Jurisdictions should take the
necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and represen-
tative offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate corre-
spondent relationships with DPRK banks.”185  In November of 2016,
following North Korea’s second test of a nuclear device in that year, the UN
again issued what many saw as harsh new sanctions.186  The sanctions
appeared to be largely designed to take further action against North Korea’s
illicit activities— which are a key aspect of maintaining power for the
regime.187  Some, however, have said that North Korea continues to be
178. See UN imposes harsh new sanctions on North Korea drafted by US, China, REUTERS
(Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/un-imposes-harsh-new-sanctions-
on-north-korea-drafted-by-us-china.aspx?pageID=238&nid=95970&NewsCatID=359
[https://perma.cc/MS9A-9TT6] [hereinafter UN imposes harsh new sanctions on North
Korea drafted by US].
179. See U.N. 1718 Sanctions Committee (DPRK), Security Council Committee Estab-
lished Pursuant to Resolution 1718, Resolutions (2006), https://www.un.org/sc/
suborg/en/sanctions/1718/resolutions [https://perma.cc/UM2V-JACQ].
180. See UN imposes harsh new sanctions on North Korea drafted by US, supra note 178.
181. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Imposes Fresh Sanctions on
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2270, U.N.
Press Release SC/12267 (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12267
.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/F9SV-EY9Q].
182. See Bradley Babson, UNSCR 2270: The Good, the Bad, and Perhaps Surprising
Opportunity for the North Korean Economy, 38 NORTH (Mar. 21, 2016), http://38north
.org/2016/03/bbabson032116/ [https://perma.cc/3S4M-FKVC].
183. See Krishnadev Calamur, How North Korea Cheats Sanctions, THE ATLANTIC (Aug.
8, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/north-korea-
cheats-sanctions/536169 [https://perma.cc/CC95-SXH6].
184. See Anti-Money Laundering Body Calls for Cutting Ties with N. Korean Banks,
YONHAP (Oct. 24, 2016, 4:24 PM), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/
10/24/0401000000AEN20161024008800320.html [https://perma.cc/HH9K-3UBF].
185. Id.
186. See U.N. 1718 Sanctions Committee (DPRK), supra note 173 at 115.
187. See YONHAP, supra note 184.
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skillful at working around UN sanctions— a disturbing assessment.188
In 2017, SWIFT, the worldwide inter-bank messaging system based in
Belgium, banned several North Korean banks from participating in its sys-
tem.189  For anyone who sends or exchanges money overseas (as addressed
earlier), SWIFT is well known and must be used if one is to be able to
easily access banks using inter-country telecommunications.190  The
SWIFT system probably (at least in my view) finally took the action
because of recent information confirmed and released by the UN in 2017
documenting North Korean use of the system.191  While North Korea will
likely still be able to access the system using foreign intermediaries (as the
DPRK has done for numerous other worldwide financial activities), the
action taken by SWIFT will still make it more difficult for Pyongyang to
abuse the international financial system.
It appears that there has been no shortage of international action
taken against North Korea— particularly since North Korea detonated its
first nuclear device in 2006 (more UN sanctions followed in the summer of
2017).192  The issue is not whether or not the international community has
issued initiatives or, in the case of the UN, resolutions.  Many resolutions
and initiatives have been issued, and in fact, their seriousness has
increased over time.  How effective have banks and financial institutions
around the world been at containing North Korean illicit and illegal activi-
ties and banking practices?  The answer appears to be that thus far, there
are many issues with containing the billions of dollars that North Korea
continues to successfully raise each year, put into international banking
institutions, and funnel back to the DPRK and Kim Jong-un’s slush funds.
The key is enforcement.  There continue to be many issues with the
enforcement of what can legitimately be considered far reaching measures
taken by the international community in an effort to contain North Korea’s
rogue state actions.  Unless and until enforcement becomes the focus of
these measures, North Korea will continue to maintain and perhaps
enhance, its ability to maintain a worldwide proliferation, illicit activities,
and underground financial network, which have been thus far proven a
188. See Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, The Novermber 2016 North Korea Sanctions:
Some Perspective, NORTH KOREAN ECON. WATCH (Dec. 1, 2016, 3:48 PM), http://
www.nkeconwatch.com/2016/12/01/the-november-2016-sanctions-some-perspective/
[https://perma.cc/T49C-ESJ7]; see also Kang Mi Jin, How Sanctions Affected North
Korea’s Economy in 2016, DAILYNK (Dec. 26, 2016, 3:07 PM), http://www.dailynk.com/
english/read.php?num=14270&cataId=NK02900 [https://perma.cc/255T-E3FJ].
189. See Don Weinland, North Korean Banks Barred From Swift Transaction System,
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/69dd9512-03d9-11e7-ace0-
1ce02ef0def9 [https://perma.cc/94PP-WD8H].
190. See id.
191. See id; see also Jeremy Wagstaff &Tom Bergin, SWIFT Messaging System Bans
North Korean Banks Blacklisted by U.N., REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-northkorea-banks-swift-idUSKBN16F0NI [https://perma.cc/8CUH-5N
KU].
192. See (3rd LD) U.N. Security Council Unanimously Adopts New Sanctions of N.
Korea, YONHAP (Aug. 6, 2017), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2017/08/
06/0401000000AEN20170806000453315.html [https://perma.cc/9LMA-M2KZ].
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successful way to maintain the Kim Family Regime.193  As a report released
in September 2017 from the UN Panel of Experts says, “[l]ax enforcement
of the sanctions regime coupled with the DPRK’s evolving evasion tech-
niques are undermining the goals of the resolutions that the DPRK aban-
don all WMD and cease all related programs and activities.”194
There has also been a plethora of UN sanctions against North Kore-
ans— typically immediately after Pyongyang’s nuclear tests, or test-launches
of long-range ballistic missiles. Two recent resolutions in 2017 were 2375,
issued in September, 2017, and 2397, issued in December, 2017.  Both of
these resolutions focused on limiting North Korea’s access to refined petro-
leum products and sets standards for repatriating DPRK workers overseas
(among other measures).  The North Korean overseas workers are not an
“illicit” activity, since, at least for now, this is a legal function.  But it is also
a big money maker for the regime and much of this money earned is proba-
bly used for weapons development and the sponsorship of the elite.  Sup-
posedly, workers will be gone from countries where they are employed
twenty-four months from December 2017.195
For a variety of reasons, these sanctions have been largely ineffective.
But the most important reason is because China and Russia are permanent
members of the UN Security Council and have insisted on watering down
sanctions against North Korea every time they occur.196  This is unlikely to
change.  Another reason that these UN sanctions have thus far been largely
ineffective at putting any real pressure on North Korea is because enforce-
ment is weak— from countries like Russia and China but also from other
nations such as several nation-states on the African continent.197
VI. China’s Role in Containing North Korea’s Illicit Activities
China is an interesting part of the puzzle both because many entities
within its borders have been complicit in North Korea’s illicit activities, and
because it has been accused (and apparently, justly so) of not being trans-
parent in going along with UN resolutions to which Beijing is a signatory.
It is this unusual role China plays in the North Korean illicit activities and
193. See David S. Maxwell, Is the Kim Family Regime Rational and Why Don’t the North
Korean People Rebel?, FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST. (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.fpri.org/arti
cle/2012/01/is-the-kim-family-regime-rational-and-why-dont-the-north-korean-people-
rebel/ [https://perma.cc/M9LU-ZJUF].
194. See Midterm Rep. of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution
1874 (2009), transmitted by Letter Dated 28 August 2017 from the Panel of Experts
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) Addressed to the President of the Secur-
ity Council, U.N. Doc. S/2017/742, at 5 (Sept. 5, 2017).
195. See Resolutions, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (Dec. 2017), https://www.
un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/resolutions [https://perma.cc/DS7B-RA3L].
196. See Demetri Sevastopulo & Katrina Manson, UN Agrees Stronger Sanctions
Against North Korea, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/f07c6800-
9736-11e7-b83c-9588e51488a0 [https://perma.cc/97PS-Q6Y3].
197. See Ham Jiha and Jenny Lee, Will New Sanctions Restrain Kim Jong Un? Maybe
Not, VOICE OF AMERICA (Aug. 9, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/will-
new-sanctions-restrain-kim-jong-un-maybe-not/3978217.html [https://perma.cc/EKS2-
T5D9].
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underground financial networks that I will address in this section.  For
many years, American policy makers have been calling for China to play a
bigger role in putting pressure on North Korea for its many rogue state
activities.198  But there are some analysts (like myself) who assess, based
on the evidence, that the government in China has no intention (at least
not yet) of putting any strong pressure on North Korea economically
(including proliferation and illicit activities) or politically.  In fact, as the
evidence in this section will show, if one were to make one statement on
what China does about entities within its borders who deal with North
Korea, or about the illegal activities of its own banks, that one statement
would be, “they look the other way.”
While there have been many muted hints by academics and others that
China may have been somewhat supporting North Korea militarily over the
years, in 2013, a disturbing analysis of North Korean transporter-erector-
launchers carrying ICBM’s in a parade in Pyongyang revealed that these
vehicles came from China.199  Beijing, of course, claimed that they were
selling Pyongyang “lumber transporters,” and everyone then moved on.200
In 2014, a variety of reports stated that the Chinese had put in place a
number of plans regarding what to do in the case of North Korean col-
lapse.201  The plans reportedly included such things as reconnaissance
units along the border to monitor any crossings, and setting up camps in
China near the border.  The plans also reportedly take into account what to
do if other powers (presumably the United States) cross into North Korea
during a crisis.  Many analysts believe that China considers North Korea a
buffer against South Korea, and of course the American troops who are
stationed there.202  China is said to supply ninety percent of North Korea’s
oil.  Russia supplies some, but on a much smaller scale.203  Thus, it was
undoubtedly disturbing to Pyongyang when China temporarily suspended
198. See Chritopher P. Twomey, China Policy Towards North Korea and Its Implications
for the United States: Balancing Competing Concerns, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS 7 (Sept. 2006),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=466572 [https://perma.cc/T8EL-KUFH].
199. See N. Korea ‘Deliberately Breached’ Chinese Contract Over Missile Vehicles: U.N.
Report, YONHAP (June 26, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2013/
06/26/50/0200000000AEN20130626005000315F.HTML [https://perma.cc/284M-
2VYH].
200. Id.
201. Parris Chang, China Manipulating Both Koreas, TAIPEI TIMES (June 21, 2014),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2014/06/21/2003593271
[https://perma.cc/TJ79-ZTE4]; Jin Dong Hyeok, Report: China’s Military Prepared for
Collaspe Scenario, DAILYNK (May 5, 2014), https://www.dailynk.com/english/
read.php?num=11836&cataId=NK00100 [https://perma.cc/4SEG-Y35Q]; Yun Sun, The
North Korean Contingency: Why China will not Cooperate, 38 NORTH (July 25, 2014),
http://38north.org/2014/07/ysun072514/ [https://perma.cc/P2Q6-8SNC]; see China
Mulls Impact of North Korea Regime Collapse on Border Area, KYODO NEWS INTERNATIONAL
(May 4, 2014), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/
140504/china-mulls-impact-n-korea-regime-collapse-border-area.
202. See KYODO NEWS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 201.
203. Kim Ga Young, A North Korea without Chinese Oil Supplies, DAILYNK (Jan. 15,
2016), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=NK00400&num=13698
[https://perma.cc/M32X-VNZ2].
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supplying North Korea with aviation fuel in 2014.204  But China reportedly
resumed supplying North Korea with aviation fuel in late 2014, moving
into 2015.205  This was no doubt a relief for the North Korean air force,
which is reliant on the fuel for its exercises and operations, and also has
stockpiled aviation fuel (but not an unlimited supply).206
Perhaps because of what I would consider largely token actions taken
by China in 2014, North Korean exports to Russia reportedly rose thiry-
two percent in that year.207  Despite this reporting, it is important to note
that in May of 2015, according to an imagery analysis, North Korea was
constructing a new transport corridor in order to conduct trade with
China.208  Despite some increases in trade with Russia, China remained
the most significant trade partner with the DPRK during 2015.209  Since
then, China has continued to be a valuable trade partner, and also
“allowed” things to happen that enable North Korea’s illicit activities and
underground finance.  Moving into 2016, there were many revelations
regarding the unique China-North Korea relationship.  In March of 2016,
China “implemented” financial sanctions against the DPRK following a
North Korean nuclear test; however, according to a source reporting from
China, money continued to flow across the border on trains, often hidden
in luggage.210  The Chinese government appears to have simply, “looked
the other way.”211  During April of 2016, military supplies continued to be
smuggled across the China-North Korea border despite sanctions.212  In
fact, front companies working for North Korea’s military were reported to
204. See Jeong Yong-Soo, China Suddenly Gives North Fuel for Planes, JOONGANG ILBO
(Jan. 31, 2015), http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=30
00349 [https://perma.cc/ME4G-8PNY].
205. See id.
206. See Peter Hayes et al., Sanctioning Kerosene and Jet Fuel in North Korea, NAUTILUS
INST., NAPSNET POL’Y FORUM, (Mar. 10, 2016), http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-pol
icy-forum/sanctioning-kerosene-and-jet-fuel-in-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/XPH4-
RKNW].
207. See Grace Oh, N. Korea’s Exports to Russia Jump 32 pct in 2014: Report, YONHAP
(Mar. 18, 2015), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/full/2015/03/18/99/1200000000
AEN20150318002300315F.html.
208. See Curtis Melvin, North Korea Building New Transport Corridor and Border Cross-
ing, 38 NORTH (May 4, 2015), http://38north.org/2015/05/cmelvin050415/ [https://
perma.cc/P6AL-D78P].
209. See Anna Fifield and Michael Birnbaum, North Korea Might Be Courting Russia,
But China Still Looms Larger, WASH. POST (May 5, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/world/north-korea-might-be-courting-russia-but-its-still-no-match-for-china/20
15/05/04/6ca7bd46-c90d-4c99-8fce-de58d93608a7_story.html?utm_term=.71f19f6239
c5 [https://perma.cc/GC25-MKZM].
210. See Seol Song Ah, Traders Send Piles of Cash by Train to Evade Remittance Block,
DAILY NK (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=13837&
cataId=NK01500 (regarding the modus operandi for moving cash across the China-
North Korea border in 2016) [https://perma.cc/S4WH-ZHZ4].
211. For more about the modus operandi for moving cash across the China-North
Korea border in 2016, see id.
212. See Choi Song Min, Military Items Smuggled Through Chinese Customs Despite
Sanctions, DAILY NK (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=
13839&cataId=nk01500 [https://perma.cc/U9JW-UAG8].
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be continuing operations in China despite sanctions.213  Thus, although
China had supposedly implemented sanctions against North Korea, by
April of 2016, it was clear that these sanctions would not be seriously
enforced.214
China’s official list of sanctions against North Korea was released in
April 2016.215  This list was released following the UN resolution that was
issued because of North Korea’s first nuclear test of that year.  Although the
list was quite extensive, it is important to focus on what was excluded from
the list.  Many items were allowed to be traded for “public welfare pur-
poses.”216  In addition, there were loopholes for trading aircraft fuel.217
The Chinese government also allowed for trade dealing with several key
items as long as the trade benefited “livelihood purposes” and did not sup-
port nuclear or missile programs.218  One wonders how a nation could
determine such a thing.  First quarter trade between China and North
Korea was up twenty percent over 2015 in 2016 before sanctions were
“enforced.”219  However, transparency is key here, and it is likely that a
great deal of trade occurred in secret after the sanctions were implemented.
Despite the seemingly rigorous official sanctions that China had placed on
North Korea on the export of oil, a reporter from a South Korean newspa-
per visiting the Chinese city of Dandong, during May of 2016, witnessed
oil being prepared for shipping to the DPRK.220  During June of 2016,
North Korean envoy Ri Su-young visited with China’s leader, Xi Jinping.221
At the request of the North Korean envoy, China reportedly agreed to pro-
vide 500,000 tons of food supplies to its neighbor to the south (about half
of what the North Koreans reportedly requested).222  In addition to the oil
flowing across the border, there have also been reports that goods and
213. See id.
214. See id.; see also John Bacon, China Joins Global Effort to Squeeze North Korea, USA
TODAY (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/04/05/china-
joins-global-effort-squeeze-north-korea/82653582/ [https://perma.cc/3BHU-4MH5].
215. See Kim Oi-hyun, China Issues Official List of North Korea Embargo Products,
HANKYOREH ILBO (Apr. 6, 2016), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_north
korea/738498.html [https://perma.cc/9JDS-FZSB].
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. Yeh Young-june, Beijing Implements UN Sanctions, JOONGANG ILBO (Apr. 7, 2016),
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3017197 [https://
perma.cc/Z3CA-CXB2]; China Imposes Trade Sanctions on N. Korea, CHOSUNILBO, (Apr.
6, 2016), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/04/06/2016040601
266.html [https://perma.cc/8L2G-CN66]; see id.
219. See Elizabeth Shim, China Trade with North Korea up 20 Percent –  Before Sanc-
tions, UPI (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/04/13/
China-trade-with-North-Korea-up-20-percent-before-sanctions/1431460560493/ [https:/
/perma.cc/EHB8-4RWZ].
220. See Shin Jin-ho, Despite Official Claims, Crude Still Flows from China, JOONGANG
ILBO (May 16, 2016), http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.
aspx?aid=3018740 [https://perma.cc/6YHE-AEVH].
221. See Sarah Kim, China-North Korea Ties get some Momentum, JOONGANG ILBO (June
3, 2016), http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3019552
[https://perma.cc/TYH6-2LHX].
222. Id.
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commodities banned under the UN resolution were also crossing into
North Korea as of June, 2016.223
In the fall of 2016, the South Korean press reported that trade between
North Korea and China in August of that year had actually gone up nearly
thirty percent over the previous year.224  The reported trade figures indi-
cated that China had found many “loopholes” to get around the UN sanc-
tions that they had supported and still claimed to be enforcing.225
Reportedly, North Korea made $1.1 billion in sales of coal to China during
2016.226  During late September of 2016, at a Senatorial hearing, both sen-
ators and those testifying from the Obama administration State Depart-
ment acknowledged that China was not forcefully enforcing sanctions.227
Senator Rubio even remarked that no Chinese entities had yet to be sanc-
tioned (likely a reference to the fact that it was already an accepted fact that
there are many Chinese front companies, individuals, and banks who con-
tinued then and now to cooperate with the North Koreans).228  In October
of 2016, North Korea and China reportedly engaged in clandestine mari-
time trade near the coastal North Korean city of Cholsan, bringing dozens
of Chinese ships, and trading a variety of goods, presumably choosing this
setting to avoid being seen along the land border.229  Other reports showed
that by September of 2016, Chinese exports of jet fuel to the DPRK jumped
391% when compared to a year earlier.230  This data was published by the
Korea International Trade Association.231
At the same September Senatorial hearing referenced above, the U.S.
State Department’s coordinator for sanctions policy, Daniel Fried, admitted
that there were several Chinese firms under investigation.232  It was in Sep-
223. See Gordon Chang, China Likely Cheating, Again, on North Korean Sanctions,
WORLD AFF. J. (June 15, 2016), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-
chang/china-likely-cheating-again-north-korea-sanctions [https://perma.cc/K7YB-
S4ZH].
224. See China-N.K. Trade Surges in August, YONHAP (Sept. 22, 2016), http://english.
yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/09/22/0200000000AEN20160922006100315.html
[https://perma.cc/3NE9-ZQAR].
225. Id.
226. See Jane Perlez, Yufan Huang, & Paul Mozurmay, How North Korea Managed to
Defy Years of Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/
12/world/asia/north-korea-sanctions-loopholes-china-united-states-garment-industry.ht
ml?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/J8YJ-HDSS].
227. See Hamish Macdonald, China Accused of Inaction on N. Korea Sanctions in Sen-
ate Hearing, NK NEWS (Sep. 28, 2016), https://www.nknews.org/2016/09/china-
accused-of-inaction-on-n-korea-sanctions-in-senate-hearing [https://perma.cc/6EN8-
5UR2].
228. See id.
229. See Kim Myong-song, N. Korea, China in Clandestine Trade in Coastal Waters,
CHOSUNILBO (Oct. 21, 2016), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/10/
21/2016102101270.html [https://perma.cc/3ACS-RU7S].
230. China Exports of Jet Fuel to N. Korea up Nearly 400 PCT in September: Data,
YONHAP (Oct. 26, 2016), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/10/26/02
00000000AEN20161026006300320.html [https://perma.cc/E3H6-EH6M].
231. Id.; see Kim Myong-song, N. Korea, China in Clandestine Trade in Coastal Waters,
CHOSUNILBO (October 21, 2016), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/
10/21/2016102101270.html [https://perma.cc/AZ5T-7VJ8].
232. See Macdonald, supra note 227.
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tember that the United States sanctioned Chinese based Hongxiang Indus-
trial Development Company.233  The Treasury Department froze all U.S.
based assets of the company, and the Justice Department pressed charges
against four individuals.234  The Hongxiang Company is an interesting
case study in how Chinese companies get around sanctions while making
big profits working with North Korean entities to make and process cash
for the Kim regime.  This is likely only the tip of the iceberg because many
other companies, banks, and individuals are likely involved in these types
of illicit activities.
According to an official report by the U.S. Department of Justice,
“[f]our Chinese nationals and a trading company based in Dandong,
China, were charged by criminal complaint unsealed today with conspiring
to evade U.S. economic sanctions and violating the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations (WMDPSR) through front
companies by facilitating prohibited U.S. dollar transactions through the
United States on behalf of a sanctioned entity in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (North Korea) and to launder the proceeds of that crimi-
nal conduct through U.S. financial institutions.”235  The report stated, “[i]n
addition, the [Treasury] department filed a civil forfeiture action for all
funds contained in 25 Chinese bank accounts that allegedly belong to
DHID and its front companies.  The department has also requested that the
federal court in the District of New Jersey issue a restraining order for all of
the funds named in the civil forfeiture action, based upon the allegation
that the funds represent property involved in money laundering, which
makes them forfeitable to the United States.  There are no allegations of
wrongdoing by the U.S. correspondent banks or foreign banks that main-
tain these accounts.”236  It is also important to note that the report states,
“ ‘[t]he charges and forfeiture action announced today allege that defend-
ants in China established and used shell companies around the world, sur-
reptitiously moved money through the United States and violated the
sanctions imposed on North Korea in response to, among other things, its
nuclear weapons program,’ said Assistant Attorney General Caldwell.”237
Assistant Attorney General Carlin remarked, “[d]enying the use of the U.S.
financial system can greatly curtail illegal activities and disrupt efforts to
provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and rogue nations.”238  I
completely agree with the last part of this quote.  By using the U.S. finan-
cial system to curtail support that Chinese entities provide North Korea,
233. See , US Actively Investigating More Chinese Firms for Dealings with N.
Korea, KOREA HERALD (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?
ud=20160929000250 [https://perma.cc/6BJE-RX3M].
234. See id.
235. Four Chinese Nationals and China-Based Company Charged with Using Front Com-
panies to Evade U.S. Sanctions Targeting North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Mis-
sile Programs, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-
chinese-nationals-and-china-based-company-charged-using-front-companies-evade-us
[https://perma.cc/F58N-P7TK].
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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real pressure can be put on the Kim regime.  With only minor exceptions
like the prosecuting of the Hongxiang Company, this largely did not hap-
pen during the Obama Administration.  In early 2017, it was revealed that
China was still importing minerals from North Korea banned under UN
sanctions.239  Around the same time, it was also reported that China had
continued to export items banned under the UN sanctions (valued at sev-
eral million dollars) to North Korea the previous year.240
China reportedly banned North Korean citizens residing in China
from opening new accounts in several banks and ordered the closing of
existing accounts in these banks as well.241  The governmental order was
released during September of 2017.242  It is not clear how this affected
smaller banks where North Korean operatives or their intermediaries often
launder their money.  In addition, given the modus operandi North Korean
operatives follow of using paid intermediaries and other loopholes, the
successful results of this move can easily be called into doubt.243  China
agreed to the sanctions in 2017 that would severely limit North Korea’s
imports of Petroleum products, but anecdotal evidence (including imagery)
suggests China continues to allow its traders to export these products to
the DPRK— on what scale this is occurring is unknown.244
Conclusion
If one is to look back at the actions of the North Korean regime in
recent years, it is clear that this is a regime which engages in rogue state
behavior in so many ways that one almost loses count.  But one must con-
sider that North Korea’s illicit activities and its illegal financial networks
that support them are not just a small aspect of the Kim regime.  Rather,
these activities are a key part of what the North Korean leadership infra-
structure needs to do in order to survive.  North Korea is more heavily
sanctioned than most nations on earth.  Thus, in order to survive, the gov-
ernment must literally work as a criminal entity in order to raise money for
the regime.  This explains both North Korea’s many clever TTP’s, as well as
its ties to international crime networks.245
239. See China Keeps Importing U.N.-Sanctioned Minerals from N.K., YONHAP (Mar. 29,
2017), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2017/03/29/0401000000
AEN20170329005400315.html [https://perma.cc/Y8R5-D5NN].
240. See China Exports US$4.25 MLN Banned Items to N. Korea Last Year: VOA,
YONHAP (Mar. 9, 2017), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2017/03/09/53/
0401000000AEN20170309008100315F.html [https://perma.cc/Q93F-C9PU].
241. Beijing Orders Banks to Close Accounts for North Koreans, DAILY NK (Sept. 9,
2017), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=14709&cataId=NK01500
[https://perma.cc/5VX2-CXDY].
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. For an example of anecdotal evidence suggesting that China has been violating
UN sanctions in order to keep North Korea supplied with petroleum products, see North
Korea: South Seizes Ship Amid Row over Illegal Oil Transfer, BBC (Dec. 29, 2017), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42510783 [https://perma.cc/B2X3-BTDV].
245. See Keegan Hamilton, North Korean Meth, Motorcycle Gangs, Army Snipers, and a
Guy Named Rambo, VICE NEWS (Mar. 18, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/north-
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The United States has tried several initiatives, from PSI to unilateral
sanctions, to the Treasury Department actions, and to joining with the
international community to bring about the UN sanctions.  Many of these
actions, however, have not produced results for two key reasons.  First, the
United States has frequently failed to sufficiently enforce initiatives that
could contain North Korea’s proliferation, illicit sales of illegal goods, and
its illegal banking activities.  Next, North Korea does not “play by the rules”
in the international system so it is often able to escape enforcement.  Amer-
ican sanctions have historically been important.  In 2005, the United
States, largely through the Treasury Department, successfully pressured
Banco Delta Asia (“BDA”) into freezing its North Korean assets.  The U.S.
officials then were able to contain North Korean efforts to move funds to
places like Europe, Vietnam, Singapore, and Mongolia.246  The threat of
banks being “blacklisted” by the United States was enough to get many
banks to turn down North Korean deposits.247  The snowball effect from
America’s actions was quite compelling.  Even banks in China were known
to freeze North Korean accounts.248  The actions (and the freezing) ended
when the United States “unfroze” the accounts in BDA.  Since that time
(and the failed nuclear agreement that followed the “unfreezing” of the
BDA accounts), North Korea has diversified its banking practices, and has
spread its spider-web financial network to places like Russia, China, South-
east Asia, Singapore, and elsewhere.249  Thus, to take actions that will once
again truly contain or at least slow down North Korea’s proliferation and
illegal financial activities, the United States would need to target several
banks (usually smaller banks) in places all over Asia, Europe, Africa, and
even the Middle East.  To date, this has not happened on a large scale, but
things may be changing.
On May 16, 2017, the UN Ambassador Nikki Haley announced that
the United States would be tightening sanctions on North Korea.250  She
also announced that the United States would go after entities in third coun-
tries who were helping with North Korea’s proliferation and its illicit finan-
cial activities that support it.251  In June of 2017, the Treasury and State
Departments imposed new sanctions on North Korean entities and individ-
korean-meth-motorcycle-gangs-army-snipers-and-a-guy-named-rambo [https://perma.cc/
BW6Q-S9P2].
246. See Josh Meyer, Squeeze on North Korea’s Money Supply Yields Results, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-macao2nov02-story.html [https://
perma.cc/2FES-YYDF].
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. Daniel Wertz & Ali Vaez, Sanctions and Non-Proliferation in North Korea and
Iran: A Comparative Study 8, FAS (June 2012), https://fas.org/pubs/_docs/IssueBrief-
Sanctions.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BED-RVKQ]; see Sangwon Yoon, Sam Kim, & Andrea
Tan, China is at the Heart of North Korea’s Illict Cash-Flow Funnel, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21,
2016), https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/china-is-at-the-heart-of-north-korea-s-
illicit-cash-flow-funnel-1.395525 [https://perma.cc/3ACP-ETFM].
250. U.S. to Further Tighten Sanctions on N. Korea, Go After Third Country Entities,
YONHAP (May 17, 2017, 6:08 AM), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2017/
05/17/0401000000AEN20170517000451315.html [https://perma.cc/LF7F-V95R].
251. Id.
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uals— including Tangun Trading Corporation and one of its partners in
Moscow that had been operating in violation of sanctions.252  According to
the Treasury Department release, “Treasury is working with our allies to
counter networks that enable North Korea’s destabilizing activities, and we
urge our partners to take parallel steps to cut off their funding sources.”253
Thus, one is led to believe that a new Presidential Administration may
finally take the necessary steps to make enforcement of sanctions a high
priority.  If focus on enforcement becomes a reality, “secondary sanctions”
on countries outside of North Korea will become key.  These sanctions
need to be on entities within countries like China, Singapore, Vietnam,
Russia, and Iran (to name several of many countries that house entities
supporting North Korea’s proliferation through illicit financial activities).
Exactly what are we referring to when we say “secondary sanctions”?  To
quote Aaron Arnold of Curry College, “[s]econdary sanctions, sometimes
referred to as extraterritorial sanctions, are an often discussed but rarely
understood policy instrument.  Whereas primary sanctions apply restric-
tions directly to U.S. persons and companies, secondary sanctions leverage
the strength and role of the U.S. financial system to target businesses and
persons outside the typical jurisdiction of the United States.  Generally,
these types of sanctions focus on blocking or restricting foreign banks’
access to the U.S. financial system.”254  These sanctions can be used partic-
ularly well by the United States because of the power of the dollar in finan-
cial markets.
The first year of the Trump Presidency has reflected more real action
against North Korea’s proliferation than the entire eight years of the Obama
Administration.  This is not a political statement.  It is simply a statement
of facts.  There are two reasons that this is so compellingly true; enforce-
ment, and imposition of secondary sanctions with teeth.  Moves that the
Trump Administration made during 2017 were important.  It must be
pointed out, however, that while this is a good start, much broader initia-
tives must occur if we are to truly pressure North Korea.  In June of 2017,
for the first time since the Treasury Department took action against BDA in
2005, they again took action against a Chinese bank— the Bank of
Dandong.255  The U.S. Treasury designated the bank a primary laundering
concern and stated that it was an entity that facilitated funds used by front
companies that were operating in support of North Korea’s WMD pro-
grams.256  This means that the Bank of Dandong will not have access to the
252. Press release, Treasury Sanctions Suppliers of North Korea’s Nuclear and Weapons
Proliferation Programs, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (June 1, 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0099.aspx [https://perma.cc/P8W8-XK4G].
253. Id.
254. Aaron Arnold, Watch Out for the Blowback of Secondary Sanctions on North Korea,
THE DIPLOMAT (Apr. 28, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/watch-out-for-the-
blowback-of-secondary-sanctions-on-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/73UA-USTP].
255. See Press release, Treasury Acts to Increase Economic Pressure on North Korea and
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U.S. financial system.257  The government of China of course protested the
move, but the U.S. government made it clear at the time that they were
going after illicit entities not governments (including China).258
According to press reports in mid-July 2017, Washington was prepar-
ing still more initiatives and sanctions against other Chinese banks as well
as other entities in China.259  State Department officials also visited Singa-
pore and other countries in Southeast Asia during mid-July of 2017, report-
edly to gain help in going after entities (banks and front companies)
working with North Korea in their countries.260  The expected actions
came in late August of 2017 when the United States Treasury specifically
targeted entities in Russia, China, Singapore, and even Namibia that were
either directly dealing in trade with North Korea’s arms programs, includ-
ing their WMD and ballistic missile programs, or raising funds that could
be used to provide financial support for arms programs, or helping to laun-
der the money.261
In June and August of 2017, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington,
DC filed three civil forfeiture actions worth millions of dollars against shell
companies that were accused of laundering funds used to finance North
257. See id.
258. Id.; Ken Bredemeier, US Blacklists Chinese Bank It Says Has Been Funding N.
Korean Weapons Development, VOA NEWS (June 29, 2017, 6:30 PM), https://
www.voanews.com/a/us-blacklists-chinese-bank-it-says-has-been-funding-north-korean-
weapons-developement/3921814.html [https://perma.cc/2U79-5RQ6]; Tony Munroe
and Shu Zhang, Blacklisted China Bank Cited as a North Korea Conduit to Global Finance,
REUTERS (June 30, 2017, 7:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-northkorea-
china-sanctions-dandon-idUSKBN19L1MD [https://perma.cc/52XQ-4C52]; Elizabeth
Shim, China Condemns U.S. Sanctions Against Entities with Suspected North Korea Ties,
UPI (June 30, 2017, 10:41 AM), https://www.upi.com/China-condemns-US-sanctions-
against-entities-with-suspected-North-Korea-ties/3361498829713/ [https://perma.cc/
LT28-7J4T]; see Treasury Sanctions 4 Chinese Entities, Targeting North Korea, THE WHIM
(July 4, 2017), http://www.thewhim.com/treasury-sanctions-4-chinese-entities-targeting-
north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/NPT2-BSQQ].
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PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-sanctions-exclusive-id
USKBN19Y28 [https://perma.cc/WKK3-JAAH]; see also Joshua Berlinger, Guns and
Money: Why US’ Top North Korea Diplomat is in Southeast Asia, CNN (July 17, 2017, 7:16
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/16/asia/north-korea-myanmar-singapore/index
.html [https://perma.cc/P5C4-VV3G].
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Korea’s WMD programs.262  A public report from Department of Justice
addressed one of the front companies based in China.  According to the
report, “[t]he United States has filed a complaint to civilly forfeit
$1,902,976 from Mingzheng International Trading Limited (Mingzheng), a
company based in Shenyang, China,” further stating, “[t]his complaint
alleges that parties in China established and used a front company to sur-
reptitiously move North Korean money through the United States and vio-
lated the sanctions imposed by our government on North Korea, said U.S.
Attorney Phillips.”263  Finally, the report states, “[s]pecifically, despite
strengthened financial sanctions, North Korean networks are adapting by
using greater ingenuity in accessing formal banking channels.  This
includes maintaining correspondent bank accounts and representative
offices abroad, which are staffed by foreign nationals making use of front
companies.  These broad interwoven networks allow the North Korean
banks to conduct illicit procurement and banking activity.”264
On September 21, 2017, the United States took action that was, in my
view, the most important and potentially damaging to North Korea’s rogue
state behavior since the Banco Delta Asia initiative in 2005.  This is not an
exaggeration.  On that day, President Trump issued an Executive Order
that essentially gave the Treasury Department full authorization to com-
pletely cut off North Korea’s access to the U.S. dollar— and thus to go after
any front company, bank, or individual who was attempting to do so.265
In other words, if any institution is caught doing business with North
Korea, they will not be allowed to do business with the United States.  This
action mirrors the type of initiatives taken by the Treasury against North
Korea in 2005 that had North Korea on the ropes by late 2006.266  The
difference is, this action is expected to be more comprehensive and much
more widespread— because North Korea’s illicit financial networks are
much more diversified and widespread than they were in 2005-2006.  The
United States can— and likely will— go after banks and front companies all
over China, but also in places such as Singapore, Malaysia, and several
countries in Africa (and elsewhere).  Now that the Executive Order has
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Executive Order on Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea, WHITE
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been issued, and therefore, the specific targeting of those entities who are
laundering North Korea’s dirty money needs to be designated, an action
that is likely to be ongoing and large-scale.
All of these are important moves and a good start.  But widespread
and comprehensive action must be taken against a wide variety of banks,
front companies, and individuals— and it is important to remember that
these elements exist all over Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, not just in
China.  It is also important to remember that token action (as was often
taken in past years leading to 2017) is nothing more than exactly that—
token action.  This action must cover all known entities and individuals
who are supporting North Korea’s illicit programs, and it must be a series
of routine and continuous acts that constantly apply pressure and readjust
as  North Koreans readjust.
The international community is another matter.  The U.S. remains the
world’s economic leader, but many other international organizations and
nation-states continue to be very critical of North Korea’s financial activity.
Key among the international community in recent years has been the UN.
The UN sanctions are now as tough as they have ever been and many have
expressed a hope that these sanctions may actually bring about a change in
the DPRK’s behavior.267  Despite the fact that the international community
is now (in my opinion) more serious than it has ever been about containing
and/or slowing North Korea’s illicit trade, illegal banking, and military
proliferation, the country that could make the biggest dent in these prac-
tices continues to be at best, reluctant to take full measures against Pyongy-
ang.  China remains at a crossroads, where it can choose either to join the
international community in putting real pressure on North Korea, or to
simply maintain the status quo.268  At least for now, the latter appears to
be the most likely option.269  Thus, North Korea’s rogue state activities as a
nation-state acting like a “crime family” are likely to continue until sanc-
tions and other initiatives by nations outside of China put real pressure on
Pyongyang.
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